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1 
WHAT DO WE WANT IN A PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY? AN 
ELECTION LAW PERSPECTIVE 
Chad Flanders* 
Although the 2008 presidential primaries were in many ways a resounding success 
in terms of turnout, attention, and sheer excitement, many noted the pressing need 
for reform. States were rushing to hold their primaries sooner than ever, giving rise 
to “Super-Duper Tuesday,” where twenty-four states had their primaries on the 
same day. The Democratic nominee at one point looked like it might be decided by 
the votes of so-called “Superdelegates”—party regulars beholden to no one. As the 
Democratic nomination contest wore on, Rush Limbaugh, in “Operation Chaos,” 
encouraged his “dittoheads” to raid the party primaries of the Democrats, tilting 
the vote against Obama, the presumptive nominee. And there were continued 
grumblings about the disproportionate influence Iowa and New Hampshire had 
on the whole process. 
 
Fortunately, reform is in the air. The Democratic National Committee’s “Commission 
for Change” has released its proposals for altering how the Democrats run their pri-
maries. It is unclear how, if at all, the Republicans will follow suit. But how are we 
to evaluate such proposals? What do we want in a presidential primary? 
 
My Article, borrowing from the vital field of election law, proposes a set of values 
by which we should evaluate the presidential primaries. By investigating the vari-
ous players in the nomination process—voters, parties, and the state—I isolate 
three major sets of “constitutional values” that are implicated in the presidential 
primary system: (1) the right of voters to an effective and meaningful vote, (2) the 
interests of the political parties in their autonomy and ideological purity (as well 
as in electoral victory), and (3) the concern of state and federal governments that 
the nomination process be legitimate, competitive, and produce a candidate who is 
capable of governing.  
 
Finally, I propose a master value—that of “deliberation”—that both explains and 
unifies the various competing values at play in the primaries. And I analyze the 
two major proposals for reforming the primaries, a national primary and a series 
of regional primaries, as well as the recommendations of the Democratic National 
Committee, in light of the goal of achieving “deliberative primaries.”  
                                                   
* Assistant professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Saint Louis, MO. 
J.D. 2007, Yale; PhD. 2004, University of Chicago (philosophy). I thank Michael Neblo for 
conversations and collaboration over many years on the topics in this Article. He should not 
be taken to agree with everything I say. Melanie J. Springer gave a guest lecture to my elec-
tion law seminar and helped spur my thinking about reforming the presidential primaries. 
Joey Fishkin helped me enormously with detailed comments on a later draft. I am indebted 
to Uduak Ifon, Terrence Burek, and Maggie Eveker for timely research assistance and to 
Christopher Bradley, Kirsten Nussbaumer, and William Baude for comments. 
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Last question—and I’m not sure if you even have a sense or if it’s 
even appropriate to speculate—but do you think the new rules will fa-
vor a certain type of candidate? Does it favor a candidate who surges 
early like in the old Iowa and New Hampshire model, or a candidate 
who is strong regionally, or a candidate with wide but not deep sup-
port across the whole country? Rules do matter . . . .1 
Introduction 
Few could have predicted that the 2008 Democratic primaries 
would be as successful as they were. Popular participation was at an 
all time high.2 People were paying attention to the candidates and 
evaluating them, rather than tuning out. By nearly any measure, 
democracy seemed to be working.3 Early predictions by pundits 
that the Democrats would choose a candidate early and that we 
were in for a long general election season were spectacularly 
wrong.4 To many people’s surprise, the Democratic primaries al-
most dragged on too long.5  
                                                   
1. Interview by Tom Shaller with Jeff Berman, Member, Democratic Change  
Commission (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/01/dcc-trying-to-
encourage-regional.html.  
2. John Heilemann & Mark Halperin, Game Change 262 (2010) (“The battle be-
tween Barack and Hillary had been historic across every dimension, from the amount of 
money spent and the numbers of voters who had participated to its sheer closeness . . . .”); 
Thomas E. Patterson, Voter Participation: Records Galore This Time, but What About Next Time?, 
in Reforming the Presidential Nomination Process 44 (Steven S. Smith & Melanie J. 
Springer, eds., 2009) [hereinafter Reforming] (“More than a score of state primary and 
caucus turnout records were set in 2008. Overall, about 57 million Americans voted in the 
2008 nominating elections, which easily eclipsed the 31 million who voted in 2000, the last 
time both major parties had contested presidential races.”).  
3. Michael Neblo & Chad Flanders, The Political Process Worked—This Time, Anyway, 
Milwaukee J. Sent., Apr. 27, 2008, http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/ 
29594264.html (“In terms of voter turnout, media attention and almost every other meas-
ure, the front-loading of the primaries seems to have caused little trouble, and the pundits’ 
worrying and hand-wringing seem to have been premature.”).  
4. See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Defusing Primary Primacy, Hartford Courant, Apr. 13, 
2007, at A9 (“With Connecticut preparing to join California, New Jersey and roughly 20 
other states in what is now being called the ‘super-duper Tuesday’ presidential primary, 
America seems inexorably headed toward a national primary—not because anyone  
necessarily wants one, but because states are rushing madly to be the ‘first’ to select the next 
presidential nominee.”); John Nichols, Primaries Gone Wild! And How to Fix Them, The Na-
tion, Jan. 21, 2008, at 11, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/mad-money-
primary-race (“That front-loading means that the decisions made before the Twelve Days of 
Christmas were finished began a frenzy of caucuses and primaries that, in barely a month, is 
all but certain to identify the presidential nominees.”).  
5. Democratic Change Comm’n, Democratic Nat’l Comm., Report of the Dem-
ocratic Change Commission 17 (2009) [hereinafter Report] (describing the process as 
“too long”(quoting Don Fowler, Former Chairman, Democratic Nat’l Comm., Testimony at 
Democratic Change Commission Meeting (Oct. 24, 2009))); James W. Ceaser et al., Epic 
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But the fact that the predictions of disaster were mistaken for 
2008 does not mean that they did not contain a great deal of truth. 
In fact, America dodged a bullet. The presence of two celebrity 
candidates, equally tenacious and well-funded, masked fundamen-
tal flaws in the way we nominate our presidents.6 It would be a 
critical error to take the fluke success of the 2008 primaries as evi-
dence that our primary system works fine and is in no need of 
reform, that our primary process is headed in the right direction.7  
We need to think seriously about the way we choose our presi-
dential candidates.8 Should we keep what we have now, a de facto 
national primary, which in most years would favor the most well-
known and well-funded candidate against the newcomer or the 
one who has ideas, but not money? And should New Hampshire 
and Iowa, states that are unrepresentative of the national interest, 
still be allowed to wield a disproportionate weight in picking our 
candidates simply because they refuse to take turns? Do we want an 
early end to the primaries followed by a general election season 
that lasts eleven months?9  
                                                   
Journey: The 2008 Elections and American Politics, at ix–x (2008) (“[T]he Democratic 
contest turned into a marathon. Having eliminated the broader field of contenders, Hillary 
Clinton and Barack Obama went head-to-head until the full schedule of contests had ended. 
After threats to take the struggle to the convention, Mrs. Clinton finally conceded in the first 
week of June. It was the longest active contest in modern times.”); Steven S. Smith & Mela-
nie J. Springer, Choosing Presidential Candidates, in Reforming, supra note 2, at 13 (“The 
front-loaded process did not turn out as predicted for the Democrats, for whom the contest 
between Senators Clinton and Obama extended until June.”); David Greenberg, Primary 
Obligations, Dissent, Summer 2008, at 35, 37 (“Particularly when his chances of winning 
seemed strong, Obama seemed resentful about having to run all the way to the finish line.”); 
see also Ceaser et al., supra note 5, at ix (“This [front-loading] arrangement led everyone to 
predict that the nominations would be decided earlier and more quickly than ever before, 
most likely by the first week in February. But fate had something else in mind.”); Gerald D. 
Skoning, We Could Learn a Lot from the U.K. Election, Chi. Trib., May 14, 2010, at 23 (lament-
ing the length of the U.S. nomination process, as compared to the U.K.’s).  
6. See Heilemann & Halperin, supra note 2, at 254 (“Quitting . . . simply wasn’t in 
the Clintons’ bloodstream.”); Evan Thomas, A Long Time Coming 53 (2009) (referring to 
the extended battle between Obama and Clinton as “the long siege”); Neblo & Flanders, 
supra note 3 (“The fact is that this year’s primaries were saved by celebrity: Obama’s remark-
able story and the possibility of a Clinton restoration. With two Democratic superstars 
running for president, what could have been a very short and early primary season was 
turned into captivating drama. We should consider ourselves lucky. But we shouldn’t let this 
deter us from serious thinking about the way we choose our presidential candidates.”). 
7. See Editorial, Primary Reforms, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2008, at 11 (“It takes nothing 
away from the achievements of Barack Obama and John McCain to take note that the system 
for choosing the parties’ nominees is seriously flawed.”).  
8. See generally James W. Ceaser, The Presidential Nomination Mess, Claremont Rev. 
Books, Fall 2008, at 21.  
9. Flanders, supra note 4 (“Unless we think seriously about how we want our prima-
ries to be run, we will end up with a system that nobody wants—a system that, as Connecticut 
Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz said, benefits the rock stars and the well-funded, who 
would dominate a de facto national primary.”); Neblo & Flanders, supra note 3.  
Flanders FTP B.doc  7/11/2011 10:57 AM 
4 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 44:4 
Fortunately, reform is in the air, as the Democratic Party an-
nounced proposed changes to the way it nominates its presidential 
candidates.10 The Republican Party is sure to follow.11 Pundits and 
academics have also chimed in, claiming the system is broken and 
in need of reform.12 But how are we to evaluate such proposals for 
reform? Changes in the primary system are often generated by 
short-term political needs, not long-term thinking about what will 
produce the best candidates. There is also the tendency for well-
meaning reformers to, in David Greenberg’s words, “act like gen-
erals fighting the last war.”13 Candidates who have won under one 
set of primary rules will be reluctant to change them.14 And most 
voters, if they think about the primaries at all, will tend to judge 
them solely in terms of the candidates they have produced. This 
will not always be a reliable indicator of whether the primary sys-
tem is fundamentally sound; a good candidate might emerge from 
a defective process. So it should be helpful to stop and think about 
what we want in a primary system. What are the interests involved? 
What values do we want to embody in the way we nominate presi-
dential candidates?  
In answering these questions, a particularly legal perspective on 
the problem of primary reform may seem to offer little in the way 
                                                   
10. See Report, supra note 5, at 18–19, 21; see also Editorial, Our Opinion: Presidential 
Primary System Needs Revision, State-Journal Register (Springfield, Ill.), Jan. 29, 2010 (not-
ing that the Illinois Reform Commission has recommended that the Illinois primary “be 
held no earlier than June”); Jeff Zeleny, It’s Never Too Soon to Think About 2010, Caucus 
Blog, (Mar. 23, 2009, 9:20 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/its-
never-to-soon-to-think-about-2012/.  
11. The Republican National Committee had discussions about the timing of various 
state presidential primaries. They are still, as of this writing, wrestling with the problem of 
front-loaded primaries. Florida’s early scheduling of its primaries has emerged as a problem. 
See, e.g., Serafin Gomez, Florida GOP Reining Back on Primary Push, America’s Election HQ 
(Mar. 15, 2011), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2011/03/15/florida-gop-reining-back-
primary-push. The Republican National Committee has, however, approved measures that 
will push back the date on which any nominee can win enough delegates to get the party’s 
nomination. See Paul Bedard, New RNC Rules Mean a Longer GOP 2012 Presidential Race, 
Washington Whispers (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-
whispers/2011/02/23/new-rnc-rules-mean-a-longer-gop-2012-presidential-race. This Article 
will focus mostly on the Democratic Party’s primary process, both because that was where 
the most dramatic changes occurred in 2008, and because the Democratic National Com-
mittee seems to be taking efforts to reform the process very seriously (and in a less ad hoc 
manner).  
12. See, e.g., Thomas E. Mann, Is This Any Way to Pick a President?, in Reforming, supra 
note 2, at 151; Larry J. Sabato, Picking Presidential Nominees: Time for a New Regime, in Reform-
ing, supra note 2, at 136; Editorial, Primary Reforms, supra note 7, at 11; Greenberg, supra 
note 5, at 35.  
13. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 35.  
14. See Nichols, supra note 4, at 13 (“[A]s FairVote’s Ryan O’Donnell says, . . . ‘once an 
incumbent is nominated and elected, he or she has no interest in changing the sched-
ule.’ ”).  
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of insight. The most valuable contribution election law has made 
so far, one might think, is the contribution of several cogent anal-
yses of whether and to what extent Congress has the power to 
reform the presidential primary system. No doubt this is useful in-
formation, and the work of Richard Hasen and Daniel Lowenstein 
is especially helpful in this regard.15 But election law can also high-
light the values that are implicated in the primary system.16 
Clarifying what these values are can help us think more critically 
about what we want in a system for nominating our presidents, and 
why our current system does not serve those values particularly 
well.17  
This Article unfolds in three parts. In Part I, I diagnose what 
went wrong in the 2008 primaries according to the conventional 
wisdom. I focus specifically on four problems that were present in 
the Democratic primaries18: the front-loading of the state primary 
races; the problem of party-raiding (as exemplified by Rush 
Limbaugh’s “Operation Chaos”); the question of the role of so-
called superdelegates; and the routine, boring, and scripted nature 
of the party conventions. Part II is organized around analyzing the 
three major sets of “constitutional values” that I see as implicated 
in the presidential primary system: the rights of voters to an effec-
tive and meaningful vote; the interests of the political parties in 
                                                   
15. See Richard L. Hasen, “Too Plain for Argument?” The Uncertain Congressional Power to 
Require Parties to Choose Presidential Nominees Through Direct and Equal Primaries, 102 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 2009 (2008); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Presidential Nomination Reform: Legal Restraints and 
Procedural Possibilities, in Reforming, supra note 2, at 173. For an important earlier essay on 
the same topic, see William G. Mayer & Andre E. Busch, Can the Federal Government Reform the 
Presidential Nomination Process?, 3 Elec. Law J. 613 (2004).  
16. In articulating these values, I rely heavily on the seminal casebook by Issacharoff, 
Karlan, and Pildes. See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, The 
Law of Democracy (3d ed. 2007). Interestingly, however, the casebook does not have any 
extended discussion of the presidential primary process. In my previous work, I have devel-
oped, in particular, the values of voter participation and deliberation. See Chad Flanders, 
Deliberative Dilemmas: A Critique of Deliberation Day from the Perspective of Election Law, 23 J.L. & 
Pol. 147, 150 (2007) [hereinafter Flanders, Deliberative Dilemmas] (noting various places in 
election law where deliberation can either be encouraged or discouraged); Chad Flanders, 
How to Think About Voter Fraud (and Why), 41 Creighton L. Rev. 93, 145-49 (2007) [herein-
after Flanders, Voter Fraud] (citing voter participation as an important value in election law).  
17. In their important collection on the 2008 primaries, Steven Smith and Melanie 
Springer observe that “there is no strong consensus about the key values to be reflected in 
the nomination process.” Smith & Springer, supra note 5, at 18. One aim of this Article is to 
help to build that consensus, by first clarifying what the values at stake are.  
18. The Republican contest did not contain nearly as many surprises. As James Ceaser 
et al. write, “[s]ometimes presidential nominations turn out just the way everyone expected 
at the beginning. Sometimes there are surprises. And then, on rare occasion, the surprise is 
that the nomination turns out the way everyone expected at the beginning. The 2008 Re-
publican nomination race was one of those rare occasions.” Ceaser et al., supra note 5, at 
53. At the same time, one major problem—front-loading—was present in the Republican 
primaries.  
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their autonomy and ideological purity; and the concern of state 
and federal governments that the nomination process be legiti-
mate, competitive, and produce a candidate who is capable of 
governing.  
Finally, in Part III, I propose “deliberation” as the key term that 
unifies the disparate constitutional values sketched out in Part II—
and evaluate various reform proposals, including the reforms pro-
posed by the Democratic National Committee, in light of how they 
foster or inhibit deliberation.  
I. Problems 
My burden in this Part is to sketch what went wrong in the 2008 
primaries in spite of so much going right. Of course, I do not want 
to gainsay that much good happened in the primaries. But it is an 
open question whether those goods (increased participation, more 
excitement and interest) were a product of the system or not. I 
suspect that they were not. Accordingly, I want to highlight those 
flaws in the system, that in future election seasons, may present 
very real and very crippling problems for our democracy. That 
2008 went on as well as it did despite these problems is, I surmise, 
our good luck and good fortune. There may be structural flaws in 
the way we select presidents, flaws that the success of 2008 did 
much to hide. 
A. Iowa and New Hampshire, and the Problem of Front-Loading 
The most obvious problem—and the one problem that created 
the most angst in pundits—was the mad rush to be the first prima-
ry.19 Traditionally, Iowa and New Hampshire have been given pride 
of place as the “first primaries.”20 Along with this priority, of course, 
came a disproportionate influence on whom the eventual nominee 
would be.21 Although a candidate could survive a stumble in Iowa, 
                                                   
19. See Report, supra note 5, at 17 (noting concerns about frontloading); Mann, supra 
note 12, at 162 (describing problem of frontloading as becoming “more prominent with 
each election cycle”). See generally William G. Mayer & Andrew E. Busch, The Front-
Loading Problem in Presidential Nominations (2004). Mayer and Busch’s book turned 
out to be prescient in predicting front-loading would be a major problem. See id. at 4–22. 
20. Sabato, supra note 12, at 142 (“A foreign observer might assume that Iowa and New 
Hampshire have some constitutional mandate always to lead the primary season.”).  
21. See Editorial, Primary Reforms, supra note 7, at 11 (noting that “[s]till, some voters—
notably those in Iowa and New Hampshire—had an outsized influence, and had candidates 
doting on them, while other states were afterthoughts.”)  
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he or she would have to make a decent showing in New Hamp-
shire, or else their candidacy was basically toast.22  
The 2008 primaries kept this feature of the primaries—one 
which had been heavily criticized in previous years.23 But other 
states tried to take at least some of the advantage away from Iowa 
and New Hampshire by moving their primaries up in the calendar 
year. The difficulty was that not only one or two states did this, 
many states did. As a result, Super Tuesday became Super-Duper 
Tuesday.24 Candidates were facing elections in twenty-four races 
(caucuses or primaries) on the same day in February.25 
From a narrow perspective, Super-Duper Tuesday was the per-
fect example of a collective action problem.26 What would have 
been rational for one state to do—jump out ahead and have more 
influence on the party’s eventual nominee—became irrational 
when many states did it. By all jumping out ahead, the result was 
that no one state would have an “extra” impact. So front-loading, at 
least from one angle, was simply counterproductive. 
But this was not the type of harm that pundits focused on. Ra-
ther, they isolated three main problems with the front-loading of 
the primaries. First, there was the problem that an early, national 
primary would favor candidates who were already well- 
established. Those with big names and reputations—think Hillary  
Clinton—would have an edge over less well-known candidates with 
                                                   
22. The 2008 Edwards candidacy, although plagued by rumors of an extramarital af-
fair, is a good example of this: after Iowa and New Hampshire, Edwards was dead as a 
serious presidential candidate. See also Thomas E. Mann, in American Enterprise Insti-
tute for Public Policy Research, The Presidential Nominating Process: Can It Be 
Improved? 21 (1980) [hereinafter AEI Panel Discussion] (“Right now if candidates don’t 
do well early on in the process, they drop in the polls, their money dries up, they lose media 
attention, and they’re dead.”); Alan Martinson, Note, La Follette’s Folly: A Critique of Party 
Associational Rights in Presidential Nomination Politics, 42 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 185, 195 
(2008) (“Indeed, the influence of the early states is emphasized by the number of candi-
dates who drop out of the presidential nominating context after losing an early state. By the 
time the later states vote, only one viable candidate may remain.”) (citation omitted).  
23. See, e.g., Cullen Murphy, Innocent Bystander: Primary Considerations, Atlantic 
Monthly, Apr. 2004, at 148 (noting “hand-wringing” about “prominent roles played by 
Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary”).  
24. Flanders, Defusing Primary Primacy, supra note 4 (noting that Connecticut was pre-
paring to join roughly twenty other states in “super-duper” Tuesday for 2008 elections); 
Primary Calendar: Democratic Nominating Process, N.Y. Times,  
http://politics.nytimes.com/election-
guide/2008/primaries/democraticprimaries/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (noting 
that more than 20 states had scheduled their contests for the earliest date allowed by the 
party without special exception).  
25. Race for the White House Remains Wide Open, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2008/POLITICS/02/06/intl.supertuesdayvote/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).  
26. See, e.g., Keith Dowding, Power 31 (1996) (stating that a collective action prob-
lem occurs when individually rational self-interested decisions fail because they are not 
coordinated with other actors).  
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little name recognition and even smaller campaign coffers. Smaller 
candidates who would need time to introduce themselves to the 
American electorate would fare poorly in a one shot “national” 
primary. 
Second, there was the risk that an early win in the Super-Duper 
primary would decisively tip the nomination in favor of one candi-
date, making him or her the nominee. As a result, the winner on 
Super-Duper Tuesday might still be relatively unknown and unvet-
ted before the general election campaign—think Barack Obama.27 
Indeed, this was one of Hillary Clinton’s major arguments for re-
maining in the primaries: she would be the one to see if Barack 
Obama had the mettle to survive the Republican attack machine.28 
An artificially shortened primary season would give way to an artifi-
cially long general election campaign dominated by relatively 
“untested” candidates. A longer primary season gives voters a 
greater opportunity to inform themselves about the candidates and 
to assess them in detail.29  
A third worry partly relates to the primacy of Iowa and New 
Hampshire, but goes beyond this. Although the place of Iowa and 
New Hampshire at the front of the primary season has been at-
tacked, it has also been thought to have the benefit of making the 
candidates engage in “retail” politics before they hit the national 
stage.30 Even bracketing the roles of Iowa and New Hampshire, the 
more states that have their primary on one day, the less likely that a 
candidate will focus his or her campaign on any one state for a pro-
longed period. A de facto national primary would remove this 
worry by shifting the focus of the candidates from a one-state-at-a-
time campaign to a national campaign. Candidates would play to 
their national profile without trying to gain a reputation in any one 
                                                   
27. See Mayer & Busch, supra note 19, at 79 (exploring the possibility that front-
loading might propel a little-known candidate to the nomination “before the public or the 
press has any real opportunity to learn much about the candidate or to conduct a thorough 
assessment of his of her strengths and weaknesses”).  
28. See Heilemann & Halperin, supra note 2, at 180 (“Out on the trail, Hillary was . . . 
almost pleading with people not to be stampeded into voting for Obama. ‘Everybody needs 
to be tested and vetted,’ she said. ‘The last thing Democrats need is to just move quickly 
through this process.’ ”).  
29. See Mayer & Busch, supra note 19, at 56 (“[F]ront-loading . . . greatly accelerates 
the voters’ decision process and thus makes the whole system less deliberative, less rational, 
less flexible, and more chaotic.”).  
30. Austin Ranney, The Federalization of Presidential Primaries 14 (1978) (re-
hearsing the argument that the quality of campaigns in Iowa and New Hampshire are 
superior because they emphasize “commitment, organization and personal contact” (quot-
ing Wilson Carey McWilliams, Down with Primaries, Commonweal, July 1, 1976, at 429)). 
Even granting this point, there seems no a priori reason why it should always be Iowa and 
New Hampshire that get to go first.  
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state. We would, in essence, have a national primary at the front 
end, and then a national general election at the back end.  
B. “Operation Chaos” and Party Raiding 
Of course, some of the problems associated with front-loading 
the primaries never materialized. The Democratic primaries did 
not end with an early knockout blow. The Super-Duper primary 
day, although it helped Barack Obama’s chances, did not decisively 
settle the primary nomination. Hillary Clinton survived, and things 
dragged on. And on. This led to its own set of problems, exclusive 
to the uniquely competitive—and acrimonious—nature of the 
fight. 
One problem was caused not so much by Hillary Clinton as by 
Rush Limbaugh, who became Clinton’s unlikely ally (at least ac-
cording to him). Fearing that Obama might cruise to the 
Democratic nomination relatively unbloodied, Limbaugh coun-
seled his legion of followers to cross over and vote in the 
Democratic primary for Hillary Clinton.31 By doing so, they would 
mark up wins for Clinton, or at the very least delegates. Obama 
would take even longer to win the nomination, which would cost 
him money. In one scenario, Clinton’s continued success (aided by 
Limbaugh’s “dittoheads”) would even mean that Obama would 
have to pick her as vice president.32 The net result would be a 
weaker Democratic slate come November. 
What enabled Republicans to cross over and vote in Democratic 
primaries were the phenomena of “open primaries,” set up by the 
state parties or legislatures in order to encourage voter participa-
tion.33 Republicans could decide not to vote in their own primary, 
which was all but over by the time Operation Chaos was  
inaugurated, and instead register as a Democrat for a day. Doing so 
                                                   
31. See Alec MacGillis & Peter Slevin, Did Rush Limbaugh Tilt the Vote in Indiana?, Wash. 
Post, May 8, 2008, at A1 (reporting that, according to Obama campaign manager David 
Plouffe, Limbaugh “had a clear factor in the outcome”); Carla Marinucci, Limbaugh Sows 
Seeds of “Chaos” in Dems’ Race, S.F. Chron., Apr. 27, 2008, at A1.  
32. Rush Limbaugh, Transcript, Rush the Vote: Operation Chaos (Mar. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_031208/content/01125108.guest.html. 
33. See About the Primary—Caucus—Convention System, About.Com, http:// 
usgovinfo.about.com/cs/politicalsystem/a/delgateprocess.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) 
(“There are two types of primaries, closed and open. In a closed primary, voters may vote 
only in the primary of the political party in which they registered. For example, a voter who 
registered as a Republican can only vote in the Republican primary. In an open primary, 
registered voters can vote in the primary of either party, but are allowed to vote in only one 
primary.”).  
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entailed no commitment to vote Democratic in the national elec-
tion.34 
Despite some breathless reporting by some media outlets as well 
as Limbaugh himself, there is little evidence that the Limbaugh 
effect was all that significant, or that it swung any states away from 
Obama.35 In an election year when there were many genuine crosso-
ver voters (that is, voters who had voted Republican in previous 
years, but who voted in the Democratic primary this year), the ef-
fects of Operation Chaos would have been hard to measure 
anyway. Some Republican voters might have really wanted Clinton 
to win the primary over Obama, and might have voted for her over 
McCain in the general election.  
Still, there was probably some effect, and we might view this as 
one of the problems with our nominating system, even apart from 
the exaggerations of Rush Limbaugh. Party nominations, we might 
think, belong to the party. But when cross-over voters who have no 
short or long term interest in the well-being of the party have a 
role in tipping the balance in favor of one candidate or the other, 
the party is harmed. We might think that this makes the process 
less “pure.” 
C. The Power of Superdelegates 
Much of the controversy in the Democratic nomination arose 
from the role of so-called “superdelegates” in picking the eventual 
nominee. This was also a consequence of the drawn-out nomina-
tion fight. At the micro level, there were some hard feelings as 
superdelegates switched away from early endorsements of Clinton 
and decided to back Obama as he emerged as the favorite.36 At the 
macro level, there were questions of why the Democratic nomina-
tion process had superdelegates at all. Certainly they were an 
                                                   
34. In some cases, however, voters would have to attest that they supported the princi-
ples of the party in whose primary they were voting. See Mark Niquette, Limbaugh Safe From 
Voter-Fraud Charges, Columbus Dispatch, Mar. 28, 2008, at 8A (“In Ohio, party-switchers are 
supposed to sign a form attesting, under penalty of election falsification—a felony—that 
they support the principles of the party whose ballot they are obtaining.”).  
35. See Todd Donovan, The Limbaugh Effect: A Rush to Judging Cross-Party Raiding in the 
2008 Democratic Nomination Contests, 6 The Forum, No. 2, 2008, at 1, 5 (finding little evi-
dence that Limbaugh influenced primaries).  
36. Georgia Congressman John Lewis was a particularly high-profile superdelegate 
who switched from Clinton to Obama, although there were others. See Heilemann & 
Halperin, supra note 2, at 231.  
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anomaly in an age of increasing popular control of the nomination 
process.37 Why were they still around? 
Superdelegates in fact, were instituted as sort of a fail-safe mech-
anism, a peer review check on a nominee who might not fare well 
in the general election or do a poor job governing38 (In the late 
1970s Jimmy Carter was perceived as just such a “weak” candi-
date39). Superdelegates were supposed to look at the party’s  
long-term interests and not merely at the short-term “likeability” of 
a candidate.40 By giving the party elders (such as members of Con-
gress, Governors, and members of the Democratic National 
Committee41) a greater say in the process, they could ensure that a 
competent and electable candidate emerged.42 Therefore, they 
were to exercise their “independent judgment” in voting for a can-
didate.43 Superdelegates would get their votes just by virtue of the 
leadership positions they held, and not be bound directly to the 
popular vote in the primaries.44  
Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic nominee prior to 
Barack Obama’s entrance, had early on received commitments 
from many superdelegates.45 But as the race wore on and Obama 
started winning more popular votes, critics questioned the role of 
the superdelegates.46 Could Clinton possibly steal the election 
                                                   
37. See, e.g., Paul Rockwell, Superdelegate System is Pure Elitism, San Jose Mercury News, 
Apr. 3, 2008.  
38. Id. (stating that the original purpose of superdelegates was to boost influence of 
party leaders so that they could screen candidates).  
39. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 12 (“President 
Carter’s inability to consult and build consensus would have made it impossible for him to 
become his party’s leader and presidential nominee under the old nominating system 
[which emphasized meeting and consulting with party regulars].”).  
40. See Ari Berman, Not So Superdelegates, The Nation, Feb. 18, 2008, at 4 (superdele-
gates designed to represent “establishment” interests and to discourage party outsiders from 
running).  
41. See Elaine C. Kamarck, Primary Politics 158 (2009) (“The category of super-
delegates was expanded in subsequent years to nearly 800 elected officials including all 
members of the Democratic National Committee.”).  
42. Ceaser et al., supra note 5, at 93 (“These ‘superdelegates’ would consist mainly of 
party leaders and elected officials. Though voters would continue to choose most delegates, 
the superdelegates would make the nominee more accountable to party organizations and 
the party in government.”)  
43. See Adam Nagourney & Carl Hulse, Neck and Neck, Democrats Woo Superdelegates, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 10, 2008, at A1 (observing that it is a function of superdelegates to exercise 
“independent judgment”).  
44. As Elaine C. Kamarck explains, superdelegates were supposed to “counter the ef-
fect of binding public primaries” and “save the party from a disastrous general election 
choice.” Kamarck, supra note 41, at 155–56.  
45. Berman, supra note 40, at 6 (“The obvious beneficiary of the superdelegates this 
time around is another establishment favorite, Hillary Clinton.”).  
46. See, e.g., Superdelegate System Ripe for Reform, Star Trib. (Minneapolis), Mar. 11, 
2008, at 8A.  
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based on the number of (super)delegates she had, even though 
she was losing many of the popular primary contests?47 Fears of a 
brokered convention loomed. 
Eventually, the issue was resolved. Obama earned enough dele-
gates to make a Clinton victory virtually impossible, plus 
superdelegates drifted to Obama on their own.48 Obama also coun-
seled superdelegates to vote according to the popular vote total in 
their district or state, if delegates were elected officials.49 Still, the 
very idea of superdelegates cut against the notion that the presi-
dential primaries should be small-d democratic affairs and so 
emerged as a problem. Why, voters asked, do we need peer review, 
or wise elders to choose our presidential nominee? And if super-
delegates only ratify the popular vote choice, aren’t they 
redundant?50  
D. Meaningless Conventions 
Finally, there is a problem that has been noticeable for several 
presidential campaigns, with the 2008 primaries being no excep-
tion. The nomination for each party concluded with a convention 
that was scripted and entirely predictable, without any drama about 
whom the party’s nominee would be. Of course, there was still 
some controversy surrounding the selection of the vice presidential 
candidate, at least on the Republican side. The announcement of 
Alaska Governor Sarah Palin was a shock, and almost completely 
unexpected by pundits.51 Her selection in turn meant that more 
people tuned in to the Republican Convention to see how she 
would perform.52 
                                                   
47. See Jessica Van Sack, Superdelegates May Exert Superpower, Boston Herald, Feb. 9, 
2008, at 4 (demonstrating concerns that superdelegates could end up determining the nom-
inee).  
48. Heilemann & Halperin, supra note 2, at 231.  
49. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 38 (noting that Obama urged superdelegates to vote 
according to popular results in district, state, or nation, insofar as these favored Obama); see 
Nagourney & Hulse, supra note 43, at A24 (quoting Obama on problematic role of super-
delegates, and urging them to consider the judgment of the voters).  
50. See Editorial, Primary Reforms, supra note 7, at 11 (“If superdelegates ratify the 
choice made by the elected delegates, they are unnecessary. If they overrule that choice, 
their influence is undemocratic.”); Greenberg, supra note 5, at 38 (noting that if superdele-
gates mimic the majority vote, they become “superfluous”); Berman, supra note 40, at 4 
(“How could the Democratic Party be so, well, undemocratic?”).  
51. See Heilemann & Halperin, supra note 2, at 364 (“When Palin took the stage with 
McCain, jaws dropped and eyes popped across the country and around the world.”).  
52. See, e.g., David Ploufe, The Audacity To Win 308 (2009) (“[G]iven [Palin’s] life 
story, coupled with the surprise nature of her selection, her entrance to the race would be 
nothing short of a phenomenon. I felt certain that all the oxygen in the campaign would 
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But this does not take away from the main point. The conven-
tions themselves, on the Republican side, and perhaps more so on 
the Democratic side, were boring.53 Clinton did not, as she seemed 
at one point capable of doing, decide to force a vote for the nomi-
nation. As a result, there was no risk of a brokered convention as 
some feared (or hoped).54 This would have created some uncer-
tainty and excitement. 
Why does it matter that conventions are boring? Conventions 
used to be tension-filled events, full of high-stakes bargaining, 
some of it healthy and democratic, some of it made in smoky 
backrooms. Forty years ago, the Democratic convention in Chicago 
was the site of fervent protest, protest that could not be contained 
behind fences or in carefully monitored “free speech” areas.55 Con-
ventions, in short, used to be important. They used to matter in 
selecting the candidates, and as sites of party dissent—and even 
turmoil. At worst, of course, they were party bosses making back-
room deals to pick the nominee or his running mate. At best, they 
were places for democratic participation and contestation.  
So the rise of boring conventions might be seen as problematic 
relative to how conventions used to be run, or perhaps could be 
run. Conventions at one point used to be points of deliberation 
and decision. Now they are carefully scripted media events, “rub-
ber stamps for registering the decisions made in primaries and 
caucuses well before the conventions meet.”56 They seem to be the 
very opposite of what democracy is supposed to look like.  
                                                   
immediately go to the newly minted McCain-Palin ticket.”); id. at 312 (calling Palin’s con-
vention speech “much anticipated”).  
53. The boringness of the conventions may have something to do with the fact that 
conventions are now mostly fund-raising affairs, and not matters of selecting candidates or 
making substantive changes to the party platforms. Regular fund-raising rules do not apply 
to convention donations. See Fredreka Schouten, Lobbyists’ Dollars Can Fund Political Conven-
tions, USA Today, Jan. 29, 2007, at 6A (“Federal rules do not limit the source or amount of 
convention donations.”).  
54. See Eleanor Clift, A Ticking Clock, Newsweek (Feb. 6, 2008), http:// 
www.newsweek.com/2008/02/05/a-ticking-clock.html (“If Hillary Clinton and Barack 
Obama can’t win the requisite 2,025 delegates on their own in the upcoming primaries and 
caucuses, we could be looking at a brokered convention.”).  
55. Kirkpatrick, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 5 (“The 1968 convention 
did deliberate and debate a wide range of questions concerning party rules and party pro-
cedures and party positions; but that kind of convention could not happen under present-
day rules.”); Norman Mailer, Miami and the Siege of Chicago (rev. ed. 2008) (providing 
a narrative description of the 1968 conventions).  
56. Austin Ranney, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 14.  
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II. Values 
Are the problems listed in Part I really problems? And are they 
the only problems, or even the most important? In order to ex-
plain why front-loading, party-raiding, the role of superdelegates, 
and boring conventions are bad (if they are bad), we need a the-
ory that explains what values should properly be promoted by a 
presidential primary. And if there are other respects in which our 
primary system is less than ideal, knowing what values matter in 
the process should help us identify those problems as well.  
To articulate these values, I turn to the field of election law, 
which for many years has been detailing and debating the role of 
the Constitution in regulating the political process.57 In doing so, it 
has brought to light several important values involving the interests 
of voters, parties, and the state. I will call these values “constitu-
tional values” for reasons that will I hope become clear.  
A. Voters 
The basic, indeed “fundamental,” value in election law is the 
right to vote. It has been labeled as such in several Supreme Court 
decisions.58 But as it has been developed in our constitutional 
caselaw and in scholarship, it is a vote with many different aspects, 
so it is important to make some distinctions. Nearly all of the vari-
ous facets of the vote outlined below are implicated in the primary 
process. 
1. The Formal Right to Vote 
The right to vote should be first considered in its formal aspect.59 
The formal right to vote is the ability to cast a ballot, and to not be 
prevented from voting by, e.g., intimidating tactics or by a poll tax 
                                                   
57. See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitu-
tionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 28 (2004).  
58. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (noting the “fundamental politi-
cal right” to vote); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (citing 
voting as fundamental political right because it is “preservative of all rights”); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (“[The] right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a 
free and democratic society.”).  
59. For an especially perceptive look at the meaning of the formal right to vote to 
which I am indebted, see Joey Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Right to Vote, 86 Ind. L.J. 1289 
(2011).  
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or a literacy test.60 It is perhaps best described as a negative right, as 
it is in most constitutional amendments regarding the right to 
vote.61 It is the right not to have one’s ability to vote interfered with 
or denied for arbitrary or unjustified reasons, such as wealth, race, 
or creed.62 
This formal right to vote has historically been implicated in de-
bates over the primaries. The famous (or infamous) “White 
Primary” cases dealt with Texas primaries that excluded African-
Americans from participation in the primaries.63 At one stage in 
the succession of cases, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the 
Texas Democratic Party to exclude blacks: the party was, they rea-
soned, a private group, and the Constitution could not reach the 
actions of private non-state actors.64 But this changed after the 
Court’s decision in Classic v. Louisiana, which found that the pri-
mary was an integral part of the overall election process.65 In other 
words, the primary now was state action and that made the parties 
in charge of running and organizing the primaries de facto state 
actors as well.66 As a result, the parties could no longer exclude vot-
ers from voting in the primaries—and not just the general 
election—based on race. 
The White Primary cases had special force in situations where 
the primaries basically were the election: where one party so domi-
nated the general election that the primary election was the only 
contest that really mattered.67 To deny a right to vote in the prima-
ry would be effectively to deny a person’s ability to have any say in 
who would eventually be elected for office (that is, who would win 
the general election).  
                                                   
60. Some of the greatest judicial and statutory accomplishments of the twentieth cen-
tury were in service of protecting the formal right to vote. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-6 (2000) (prohibiting literacy tests); Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 
(finding poll taxes unconstitutional).  
61. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. XV, XIX (stating that the right to vote can’t be 
abridged on basis of race or sex).  
62. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 668 (“Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to 
one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of 
wealth or property, like those of race are traditionally disfavored. To introduce wealth or 
payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrel-
evant factor.” (citation omitted)).  
63. See generally Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 
(1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).  
64. See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 53–55 (1935).  
65. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941).  
66. See Smith, 321 U.S. at 663–64.  
67. See Terry, 345 U.S. at 469 (“The only election that has counted in this Texas county 
for more than fifty years has been that held by the Jaybirds from which Negroes were ex-
cluded. The Democratic primary and the general election have become no more than the 
perfunctory ratifiers of the choice that has already been made in Jaybird elections . . . .”).  
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This does not seem to accurately describe the present-day presi-
dential primaries. It is simply not the case that one party or 
another has a “lock” on the general election, so that to deny a per-
son the right to vote in the Democratic or Republican primary 
would be effectively to deny that person a role in the general elec-
tion. Nonetheless, the formal right to vote could be relevant in 
some present-day circumstances.  
Some states run their primaries via a caucus system, and this may 
present problems even with the formal right to vote, because peo-
ple may have trouble attending the caucuses.68 They may be held at 
odd times, or they may be held in houses that are not accessible to 
the handicapped or the elderly.69 They may also involve a large 
time investment. Furthermore, you cannot vote absentee; those 
overseas and away will not have the right to vote.70 In short, the 
caucus system may in fact end up preventing a large number of 
people from even attending or participating in the caucus itself.71 
This, we might think, amounts to a denial of the formal right to 
vote as well. Barriers are being set up which stop some people from 
participating.72 To be sure, these barriers may not be as severe as a 
poll tax or a literacy test, but they are obstacles—obstacles that may 
mean that people do not get to exercise their formal right to vote 
at all. 
Also, we might consider that in the 2008 contest, Democratic 
voters in Michigan and Florida almost were refused representation 
in the convention, because they moved up their primaries in viola-
tion of national party rules. The Democratic leadership threatened 
                                                   
68. Caeser et al., supra note 5, at 97 (“In theory, caucuses fostered community and 
civic deliberation. In practice they prevented participation by those who had little time to 
spare.”).  
69. See Tova Andrea Wang, The Century Foundation, Issue Brief: Has America 
Outgrown the Caucus? Some Thoughts on Reshaping the Nomination Contest 5 
(2007), available at http://tcf.org/publications/pdfs/pb629/caucusbrief.pdf (indicating 
that caucus sites may not be accessible to the handicapped and the elderly); see also Green-
berg, supra note 5, at 37 (“The events’ sheer length deters the time-pressed wage earner, the 
single mother, the ailing grandfather.”); Richard L. Hasen, Whatever Happened to “One Person, 
One Vote”? Slate (Feb. 5, 2008, 5:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2183751/ (“Orthodox 
Jews complained that they couldn’t vote in the Saturday morning Nevada caucuses.”).  
70. See Wang, supra note 69, at 4 (“There is one group of voters that is absolutely and 
completely barred from participating in presidential caucuses: military and overseas vot-
ers.”); Editorial, Primary Reforms, supra note 7, at 11 (“[P]articipants generally have to 
commit themselves for hours, a sizable burden on the right to vote, especially for people 
who care for children or sick relatives. There is no absentee voting, so caucuses disenfran-
chise voters who have conflicting work schedules; who are out of town, including in the 
military; or who are too sick to travel to the caucus site.”).  
71. See id. at 2 (noting lower turnout in caucuses than in primaries).  
72. Id. at 3 (describing the many barriers voters may face in trying to participate in 
caucuses).  
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to throw out their primary votes, or alternatively, only seat half the 
delegates elected from those states. Neither of these things hap-
pened, but they almost did,73 and we might think that if they did, 
voters in those states would have been deprived of their right to 
vote. They would have cast ballots, but those ballots would not have 
counted, or not counted for as much. It would be as if they had 
gone through the motions of casting a ballot, but then all, or near-
ly all, of their votes had been thrown out.  
2. The Right to an Effective Vote 
Much election law scholarship has not been especially con-
cerned with the understanding and articulation of the formal 
aspect of the right to vote. After all, such an understanding of the 
right to vote is rather easy to come by. This is not to deny, of 
course, that achieving the formal right for everybody to vote has 
been the subject of many and important historical struggles.74 But 
an increasing amount of attention in election law has been paid to 
the right to an effective vote: the ability not just to cast a ballot but 
also to be able to exert the same influence on an election as other 
voters. The meaning of such a right has proved elusive, so that we 
might be tempted to deny that the right to vote has such an aspect. 
Surely everyone wants their vote to make a difference in an elec-
tion, but is there a right to make a difference? 
Although the idea of the right to an effective vote emerged in 
the “one person, one vote” context,75 it gained a special salience in 
the context of racial gerrymandering. On the one hand, African-
Americans that were in a majority-white district had the formal 
right to vote. On the other hand, it seemed obvious that the point 
of the majority-white district was to make sure that black voters had 
no influence on the outcome. So long as the district was majority 
white, there would never be an African-American candidate of 
choice. 
                                                   
73. In the Democratic primaries, Michigan and Florida were initially stripped of half 
their delegates for front-loading their primary contests. See Martinson, supra note 22, at 199. 
But these were restored at the Democratic National Convention. See Ceaser et al., supra 
note 5, at 60; see also Richard L. Hasen, Taking the Democratic Party to Court, Slate (March 7, 
2008, 11:05 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2186011/ (describing suit brought by Floridians 
complaining of disenfranchisement if their delegates were not seated).  
74. Flanders, Voter Fraud, supra note 16, at 110–11 (discussing formal right to vote or 
the “right to participate”).  
75. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (“Full and effective participation by 
all citizens in state government requires . . . that each citizen have an equally effective voice in 
the election of members of his state legislature.” (emphasis added)).  
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Whatever we think the correct remedy to this problem is, there 
does appear to be a problem, and it is a problem relating to the 
effectiveness of the right to vote. In the abstract, there might not 
be any unfairness if your favored candidate does not win. However, 
if the district has been “stacked” in such a way that your favorite 
candidate never had a chance to win—and this has been deliber-
ately orchestrated by the way district lines have been drawn—then 
we might wonder if your right to vote has not, in some way, been 
denied. You have not been denied the right to formally cast a vote, 
perhaps. You can put your ballot in the box. But you have been 
denied your right to have a role in influencing the election; the 
vote you cast will not be an effective vote. 
An analogous problem to the problem with majority-white dis-
tricts appears in the context of the presidential primaries. If the 
presidential nominee is all but determined by the Iowa caucus and 
the New Hampshire primary, then those later on in the process 
may feel deprived of their ability to influence the selection of the 
nominee. They will have the formal right to cast a ballot, but their 
vote will not matter.76 Indeed, the later a state holds its primary, the 
less likely a voter in that state will have any influence on the out-
come of the competition. Some have even raised the prospect that 
this lack of influence, if it results in African Americans being de-
nied an effective voice, may violate the Voting Rights Act.77 Iowa 
and New Hampshire, states that do have a disproportionate influ-
ence in selecting the nominee, tend to be racially unrepresentative 
of America.78  
Second, the role of superdelegates may be seen as reducing the 
effectiveness of one’s vote. Superdelegates qua individuals have a 
much greater power to influence the selection of the eventual 
nominee. Whereas a person voting in a primary will only contrib-
ute to her favored candidate’s winning some delegates, a 
superdelegate on his or her own has the power to be a delegate for 
a candidate. This results in a disproportionate influence on the 
part of the superdelegate. This may be thought of as unfair, and a 
                                                   
76. See Rob Ritchie & Paul Fidalgo, Primary Power to the People, FairVote (July 17, 
2009), http://www.fairvote.org/primary-power-to-the-people (“[W]ith contests spread apart, 
we always run the risk of nominations being wrapped up well before the majority of Ameri-
cans have even tuned in, essentially disenfranchising them.”).  
77. See Justin Driver, Underenfranchisement: Black Voters and the Presidential Nomination 
Process, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2318, 2331–32, 2339 (2004) (claiming that the primacy of Iowa 
and New Hampshire could be challenged under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). 
78. See id. at 2322–23 (“The racial homogeneity of the early-voting states, along with 
their lack of a major metropolitan area, establishes a domestic agenda that often overlooks 
issues that strongly affect African Americans.”). With the election of Obama, this worry may 
have less force.  
Flanders FTP B.doc  7/11/2011 10:57 AM 
Summer 2011] What Do We Want in a Presidential Primary? 19 
denial of the ability to have an equal influence in selecting the par-
ty’s nominee. 
The parties are aware of this problem. Indeed, many states in 
the Democratic primaries allot delegates on a proportional basis, 
that is, the person who gets the highest vote total in the state does 
not win all the delegates. This way, the person who votes for the 
losing candidate may still have his voice “heard” because his vote 
will potentially add to the count of delegates for his or her candi-
date. This can be contrasted with the winner-take-all nature of the 
Republican primaries, where if you are in the minority in a state, 
your influence is essentially lost.79 Then again, in some Democratic 
primaries, heavily Democratic districts are sometimes given more 
delegates, giving voters in those districts a disproportionate influ-
ence, so a version of the unequal influence problem reemerges.80  
In short, we can give the right to an effective vote some mean-
ing, so long as we are clear about specifying the context in which 
such a “right” can be asserted. Those who vote in primaries where 
the nominee has already been, for all intents and purposes, cho-
sen, may feel that their vote does not matter, because it cannot 
influence the selection of the nominee. So too might voters feel 
they have less influence if their state awards only a few delegates, or 
if superdelegates have a greater power to choose the nominee than 
they do. In all of these cases, we can give some credence to the idea 
that people may unfairly lack the power to have effective influence 
over their party’s nominee. 
3. The Right to a Meaningful Vote 
Related to the right to vote is the idea of a meaningful vote. This 
notion is perhaps even more obscure than the right to an effective 
vote. Surely it might be thought that the two concepts overlap, at 
least because a meaningful vote would seem to have to be, at least 
in part, an effective one. But here I will be using “meaningful” vote 
in a sense different from having the ability to exert an influence on 
the process of choosing a nominee. I will be using it to refer to the 
right of voters to vote for a candidate he or she prefers.  
                                                   
79. Editorial, Primary Reforms, supra note 7, at 11.  
80. Hasen, supra note 15, at 2009–10, 2010 n. 3 (“In Texas, for example, heavily Dem-
ocratic districts are weighted more heavily in delegate selection than districts with more 
Republicans, and about a third of the delegates are awarded through caucuses rather than 
primaries. In 1988, for example, Michael Dukakis won the state with 33% of the vote in the 
Texas primary compared to Jesse Jackson’s 25%, but they split Texas delegates almost even-
ly.”).  
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We might have a hard time, initially, seeing this as a right a voter 
has. If a voter does not feel that there are any candidates who ade-
quately represent her interests, she may feel that she lacks a 
meaningful choice in the primary process. But does this rise to the 
status of a right? In some contexts, it may. Consider if the state puts 
onerous restrictions on the rights of third party candidates, so that 
few are able to run,81 or prevents a voter from writing in her fa-
vored candidate, so that she is “forced” to vote for the major two 
party candidates. Justice Kennedy, for one, has said that a voter in 
this situation may be deprived of a “meaningful” vote in the elec-
tion.82 This is because the voter may feel that she is “substantially 
limited in [her] choice of candidates.”83 She might feel that her 
right to vote has been diminished insofar as she has been prevent-
ed from voting for the candidate that she would prefer to vote for.  
We might also look at the right to a meaningful vote as in part a 
right for candidates to run for office. The individual’s right to vote 
has always been bound up with the right of candidates to run for 
an office; the Supreme Court has said that the two sets of rights 
cannot be neatly separated.84 Individuals can have standing if their 
favored candidate is excluded,85 because part of their right to vote is 
bound up with having a certain candidate run. So just as a voter 
may have a right to a meaningful choice of candidates, a candidate 
may assert—if only through the voters—his right to be part of a 
slate of candidates on the ballot.  
The presidential primary will tend to limit the choice voters have 
among candidates in a variety of ways. Suppose that the early pri-
maries favor a certain type of candidate, or that a national primary 
means that the field is narrowed down early on in the process. 
Some who vote in later primaries may feel that they no longer have 
a meaningful choice among candidates. Or perhaps the process as 
a whole favors those candidates who are effective at raising money 
or who already have a celebrity status. The process may make it 
very difficult for those who are not well-funded or who have little 
                                                   
81. See Flanders, Deliberative Dilemmas, supra note 16, at 147, 155 & n.40 (discussing 
ways in which election law tends to entrench the two major parties).  
82. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Because 
[the plaintiff] could not write in the name of a candidate he preferred, he had no way to 
cast a meaningful vote.”).  
83. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143–44 (1972).  
84. Id. at 143 (“[T]he rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend them-
selves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, 
correlative effect on voters.”).  
85. See, e.g., Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1231, 1233 (11th Cir. 1996) (voters have 
standing to sue when their favored candidate was excluded from the Republican Presiden-
tial primary).  
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name recognition to run campaigns. Again, a person voting in the 
primaries may feel that there is not a meaningful choice among 
candidates, and so she would not have the right to cast a meaning-
ful vote. 
The caucus system also presents an example where people may 
be routinely denied the opportunity to cast a meaningful vote. In 
the typical caucus, a voter whose candidate does not receive a fixed 
percentage of the vote in the first round of voting—usually fifteen 
percent—will not be able to “vote” for that candidate in later 
rounds. There will be a revote, and the person must instead vote 
for one of the top vote-getters.86 Voters may have the ability to par-
ticipate in discussions regarding who will be the eventual nominee 
and their voice will be heard, but at a certain point they may no 
longer be able to cast a vote for their candidate of choice. She can 
side with a candidate, and may be vital in getting that candidate 
delegates. But she will not be able to vote for the candidate that 
she prefers. So while this denial may not be the denial of a formal 
right to vote or the right to have an influence on the process, it 
may be seen as the denial of her right to cast a “meaningful” vote. 
But I should emphasize that though they are related, the right to 
a meaningful vote and the right to an effective vote are distinct 
concepts. The right to an effective vote refers to the influence your 
vote has in the election. A diluted vote is a less effective vote be-
cause the odds of your vote making a difference are decreased; 
sometimes, in the case of majority white gerrymandered districts, 
the influence your vote will have in electing a candidate, if it is a 
minority candidate, can shrink to zero. 
A right to a meaningful vote, by comparison, implicates the di-
versity of the field of candidates running, and whether there is a 
candidate running who matches up with your preferences, or more 
generally, who you think is running on an attractive platform. Even 
if your favored candidate may never win the election, having a 
meaningful vote means that you get at least the chance to vote for 
him or her. This is another way of saying that a right to a meaning-
ful vote may not be a right to an effective vote. A meaningful vote is 
one cast in favor of a candidate you like whether or not your vote is 
effective in getting that candidate elected. 
                                                   
86. Wang, supra note 69, at 1 (explaining the caucus system).  
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B. Parties 
A second area of value that election law has spent some time 
identifying and specifying involves the rights of parties.87 The rights 
of parties and the rights of voters are not easily separated—just as 
the rights of voters and the rights of candidates cannot be easily 
separated. Parties exist to help give voice to a group of voters, to 
focus their energies in support of a particular candidate.88 Also, as 
we have seen with the White Primary cases, parties also function in 
a governmental capacity; they can help run elections. This is espe-
cially the case when it comes to primaries. The primaries are party 
primaries; they are designed to find a candidate who can represent 
the party, as well as to win in the general election.  
But the interest of the party is not simply reducible to the inter-
ests of the voters, to the interests of the candidates, or to a mere 
functional role. Parties have interests, and represent values in their 
own right.  
1. The Right to Party Autonomy 
The first value associated with parties is best seen as a negative 
one: it is the value to parties being left alone to experiment and do 
what is best for their members and the party itself.89 This is some-
times a problematic value, as it was in the case of the White 
Primaries.90 There the party could not be left alone, or else the 
rights of black voters would be violated.  
But apart from the White Primary cases, the Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized value in letting the party pursue its goals as 
it best sees fit. In the context of primaries, that means using differ-
ent methods of choosing the nominee (a primary or a caucus), 
experimenting with the order of states, and allowing non-members 
of the party to vote in the primary.91 The success of each different 
                                                   
87. For an overview, see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political 
Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1741 (1993), and Robert Wiygul, Private Rights or 
Democratic Virtues? Justice Scalia and the Associational Rights of Political Parties (2007) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).  
88. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 
629 (1996) (describing role of parties).  
89. See, e.g.,. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976) (“[P]arty mem-
bers . . . have a ‘right to organize a party in the way that will make it the most effective 
political organization.’ ” (citation omitted)).  
90. See supra Part II.A.1.  
91. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 36 (“[T]he court has on the whole granted parties a 
wide berth of autonomy in setting their rules. It has overturned, for instance, state laws 
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experiment is not the point—the point is that the party should 
have the freedom to decide how to run its own internal affairs. 
Again, this is best seen as a value involving mostly what parties 
should be allowed to do, not what they necessarily should be doing. 
The party should not be seen merely as a tool of the state, nor 
merely as a vehicle for individual voters to express their prefer-
ences. This “negative” freedom from external constraint enables 
the party to further its own goals.  
The goals of parties in managing their primaries are two-fold, 
and sometimes conflicting. They are the goals of pursuing party 
representativeness, and achieving candidate electability.92 By party 
representativeness, I mean the value of having a candidate who 
adequately represents the party’s values, and can be counted on as 
being a standard-bearer for the party in the general election. The 
goal of electability is rather straightforward. It is the goal of having 
the party’s nominee be a candidate who can actually win in the 
general election, and not merely be a symbolic effort to send a 
“message” to those in power.  
The party needs flexibility in order to decide how to prioritize 
these two goals. In some cases, the party may choose to open its 
primaries to voters who have not registered in the party.93 This may 
be seen as putting the goal of electability in front of the goal of 
party purity. The party may reason that it is better having non-
members of the party participate in its primary because that way a 
more “electable” candidate will be chosen. Of course, this decision 
may also present risks: a candidate may be chosen who does not 
adequately represent the party faithful. Still, the value of party au-
tonomy says that this is a decision best left to the party.94 
A further distinction should be made when it comes to party au-
tonomy. For there are at least two levels at which party autonomy 
might be a going concern: we could be talking of the autonomy of 
a state party, or the autonomy of the national party. As history has 
shown, the interests of the state party and the interests of the  
                                                   
mandating or prohibiting ‘open’ primaries, in which nonparty members are allowed to 
vote.”).  
92. Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, The Law of De-
mocracy: Teacher’s Manual 64 (3d ed. 2008) (emphasizing “two very different models of 
what parties are about: ideology and winning elections”).  
93. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 208 (1986) (striking down a 
statute that put “limits upon the group of registered voters whom the Party may invite to 
participate” in its primaries).  
94. This is true whether the nature of the primaries is decided by the state or by the 
party.  
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national party do not always perfectly align.95 And in the context of 
the primaries, some states have revolted against the national party 
by holding their primaries on dates earlier than the national party 
would allow. This resulted in sanctions for some states, but sanc-
tions that were ultimately toothless.96 
So when we speak of party autonomy, we should distinguish be-
tween state party autonomy and national party autonomy. The 
goals of state and national parties will be similar, but will be differ-
ently inflected. Whereas a national party will want a candidate who 
represents the national party’s interests, the state party will want a 
candidate who best represents the demographic of the state. And 
whereas both state and national parties will want a winning candi-
date, who they feel can win may be a source of disagreement. 
2. The Right to Party Purity 
We have already briefly canvassed the second value associated 
with parties, and that is their “purity,” roughly understood as “ideo-
logical purity.”97 Parties are important because they represent a set 
group of interests, and interests that are of the same type.98 Parties 
do not merely exist to elect candidates, although that is certainly 
part of their job. Parties also exist simply to represent a certain 
point of view, and this point of view is not merely reducible to the 
aggregate interests of its members (although there must be some 
relationship between the views of the party and the views of its 
members). The party, to some extent, exists in its own right, be-
yond what its current members believe. 
Why are ideologically “pure” parties a good thing? One aspect 
simply is that pure parties are best thought to represent the party 
faithful. To this extent, the party is a vehicle of its members, espe-
cially the members that are most vested in the party and furthering 
its message. But the party also is its message, and it might be 
thought to be a good thing that its message is as clear as possible, 
                                                   
95. See, e.g., Democratic Party of the U.S. v. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 107–12 (1981) 
(responding to a clash between national Democratic party and state party about whether the 
national party had to accept results of a primary).  
96. The Republican party ended up stripping several states of half of their delegates 
because they held early contests, but this ended up mattering little to the outcome of the 
contest. For the results of the Democratic sanctions, see supra note 73.  
97. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) (acknowledging spe-
cial First Amendment protection for the “process by which a political party ‘select[s] a 
standard bearer who best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences’ ” (citation omit-
ted)).  
98. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 
604, 629 (1996) (“[Parties] . . . exist to advance their members’ shared political beliefs.”).  
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and that it represents an ideologically distinct way of looking at the 
world.99 Parties at least purport to give a consistent philosophy of 
governing. The more parties are concerned solely with winning, 
the less they may be able to project this philosophy of governing. 
Party purity is valuable just insofar as having candidates who are 
able to articulate and defend a consistent philosophy are appeal-
ing. There is also a related, pragmatic interest in having parties 
with clear messages: it enables more informed choices by voters 
because they can “rel[y] on party labels as representative of certain 
ideologies[.]”100  
The drive for ideological purity in parties may lead in some in-
stances to the need to protect parties from themselves.101 Parties 
may be tempted by the prospect of victory—or the frustration of 
continually losing—to broaden their appeal and accordingly dilute 
their message. But this may be thought to defeat the purpose of 
having the party in the first place. If the party is simply a way to get 
someone who would win, then why have an ideologically distinct 
party at all? Why have party platforms? When we start focusing 
more on a party’s ability to elect a candidate, and less on its ability 
to form and promote a distinct message, we start losing the point 
of having parties at all. This suggests that party purity, more than 
party autonomy, is the main value that should be associated with 
parties. 
We might view the role of superdelegates as serving the interests 
of the party’s purity. Superdelegates, the theory goes, are less in-
terested in the short-term interest of the party in producing a 
popular candidate who can win.102 They are interested, instead, in 
the party producing a candidate who can faithfully represent the 
party’s interest in the general election and then—just as important-
ly—who can govern effectively and put the party’s platform into 
law and policy. The superdelegates will want, then, a candidate who 
is accountable to the party, and not merely to the people. Or to put 
this in a less tendentious way, they will want a candidate who is 
                                                   
99. See id. at 615 (“A political party’s independent expression . . . reflects its members’ 
views about the philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together . . . .”).  
100. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976).  
101. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 237 (1986) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (asserting that the State may have the right to “protect the Party against the Party 
itself” in the interests of retaining party purity).  
102. Although this is not to say that this might also be a concern of theirs. The point is, 
it is not the only concern, or even the most important. Bruce Ackerman has recently empha-
sized the moderating function of superdelegates. See Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and 
Fall of the American Republic 17 (2010) (“When party chieftains did the picking, they 
focused on candidates who might win the support of the median voter in their state.” (cita-
tion omitted)).  
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faithful to the party’s vision, and not merely to the transient inter-
ests of voters in the general election. Of course, they will want a 
candidate who will win. But, at least in principle, they should not 
be willing to back a candidate who wants to win at all costs—
including the cost of diluting or dirtying the party’s message. 
C. The State 
Finally, we come to the interests of the state in the primary pro-
cess. Much in the same way that a party’s interest will overlap with 
the interests of the voters that make up the party, so too will the 
state be interested in protecting the rights of voters and parties. 
The state will want to enforce at least the individual voters’ formal 
right to vote, and perhaps also take measures (such as the Voting 
Rights Act and amendments to it) to ensure that voters have an 
effective right to vote. It will want to protect the autonomy of par-
ties and it is also the case that voters and parties will have shared 
interests with the state.  
The state will always have a generic interest in protecting the 
rights of individuals and entities under its care—or at least it 
should have such an interest. The state, for instance, has an inter-
est in protecting prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment or 
in preserving the Second Amendment rights of gun owners. But 
what I want to discuss here is how the state has special election-
related interests in protecting the rights of citizens and parties. 
These interests will go beyond merely protecting the right to vote 
of citizens or the autonomy of parties, although it will obviously 
include them. 
1. Legitimacy 
The first and most important interest of the state in elections is 
to ensure election results that are accepted as legitimate by citi-
zens.103 If voters are prevented from voting by intimidation, or if 
there is widespread voter fraud, the state may be concerned that 
                                                   
103. This is also sometimes phrased as protecting the overall “integrity” of the election 
process. See, e.g., Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 845 (“In addition to protecting the associational 
rights of party members, a state has a more general, but equally legitimate, interest in pro-
tecting the overall integrity of the historic electoral process.”). See also Mann, in AEI Panel 
Discussion, supra note 22, at 2 (“The process has to be legitimate; it has to be perceived as 
fair, as proper, as appropriate by citizens and by leaders. If they have no confidence in the 
system, it becomes illegitimate, and that in turn works to undermine the system.”).  
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the election results are not valid.104 The winner of the election may 
not correspond to the candidate the voters actually chose.105 This 
will make it less likely that the winner will be accepted as legiti-
mate, creating a serious problem for the state. 
Or consider another example taken from the campaign finance 
context. The state may have an interest in preventing the impres-
sion that votes can be bought, or that wealthy donors have a 
greater role in the selection process than non-wealthy voters.106 If 
people think the election is corrupt in either of these ways, they 
may not accept the winning candidate as legitimately elected. They 
will think that the way the election was decided was not by the at-
tractiveness of the candidate’s message or by his skills as a 
campaigner, but only because he was able to outspend his oppo-
nent. In the Supreme Court caselaw, anti-corruption is a value 
closely linked to legitimacy, if not one that is precisely identical to 
it.107  
Legitimacy is a hard value to define precisely. It can have a nor-
mative meaning, but it can also have a descriptive one. Here I am 
mostly interested in descriptive legitimacy.108 The state has an in-
terest in having an election that citizens will accept as producing a 
winner who is legitimate—even if, perhaps, they should not accept 
that result. This allows the state considerable leeway in tolerating 
some practices that might not be ideal in selecting candidates who 
can govern well, or who adequately represent the interests of citi-
zens.  
                                                   
104. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1620 (2008) (noting 
state interests in preventing voter fraud and thereby protecting public confidence in the 
“integrity and legitimacy of representative government”); Center for Democracy and 
Election Management, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections: Report of the Com-
mission on Federal Election Reform 18 (2005), available at http://www1.american.edu/ 
ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf (“The electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if 
no safeguards exist to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters.”).  
105. Flanders, Voter Fraud, supra note 16, at 122 (describing cases of “massive fraud” 
where candidate with most legitimate votes may not have won).  
106. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“[R]estrictions upon the amount any one individual can contribute to a particular candi-
date seek to protect the integrity of the electoral process—the means through which a free 
society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action.”); An-
drew N. DeLaney, Note, Appearance Matters: Why the State has an Interest in Preventing the 
Appearance of Voting Fraud, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 847, 860 (2008).  
107. See Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for De-
mocracy, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1036, 1036–87 (2005) (analyzing Supreme Court campaign 
finance decisions and their use of the idea of corruption).  
108. See, e.g., Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 19 (2006) (explaining legitimacy 
as in part whether people generally accept the decisions and policies of legal decision-
makers).  
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My emphasis on descriptive legitimacy might make it harder to 
characterize the preference given to New Hampshire and Iowa as 
illegitimate. The priority given to those states may result in candi-
dates who do not fairly represent the interests of most members of 
the Democratic Party. But it is hard to say that the primacy given to 
these states renders the selection of the Democratic nominee illegit-
imate. And indeed, most people do not see the preference given to 
New Hampshire and Iowa as rendering the system illegitimate. 
They may not like it,109 but they do not think that it taints the even-
tual nominee, so that if he wins the primary based on the 
momentum he has coming out of Iowa and New Hampshire, he is 
not “legitimately” the winner. This of course could change. 
By contrast, in several cases the Court has recognized a state in-
terest in preventing party raiding, based on preserving the 
“integrity” of the electoral process.110 This may entail limiting the 
right of parties to invite whomever they want to participate in their 
primary process. If the rules for letting non-party members vote are 
too lax, and so subject to abuse,111 the voters may end up selecting a 
candidate that most members of the party would not accept as legit-
imate.  
2. Competition 
A state interest which has been recently examined with some 
subtlety by election law scholars is the state’s interest in competitive 
races.112 It may be hard to see this as truly a distinct interest the 
state has, but a little digging shows why competition is a value in 
election law. On the one hand, a competitive election might be 
thought to be a more legitimate election. In a competitive election, 
candidates are tested, and voters get a good chance to evaluate the 
merits and failings of each of the individual candidates. Moreover, 
if an election is dominated by a candidate who is well-financed, 
voters may think he has won the election less due to his qualifica-
                                                   
109. Although this is unclear. See Melanie J. Springer & James Gibson, Public Opinion 
and Presidential Nominating Systems, in Reforming, supra note 2, at 123 (indicating that less 
than 50% of those polled favored a system where New Hampshire is not first).  
110. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 219 (1986) (noting the 
state’s legitimate interest in preventing party raiding in order to protect “integrity of the 
electoral process”); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1986) (citing 
state interest in preserving stability). See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization 
of Democratic Politics, in A Badly Flawed Election: Debating Bush v. Gore, the Supreme 
Court, and American Democracy 155, 165, 182 (2002).  
111. As perhaps happened in “Operation Chaos.” But see Niquette, supra note 34, at 8A.  
112. Richard Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, in The Vote 140, 155 (2001) (explaining 
value of “robust competition” in election law).  
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tions than to his ability to outspend the other candidates. So this 
may also influence whether the candidate is perceived as “legiti-
mate” or not. 
On the other hand, and to anticipate the value we will be con-
sidering next, a competitive election may be a way of testing to see 
if the candidate will be effective at governing, if she is elected. 
Campaigns, both in the primary and in the general election, are 
thought to test the same virtues as governing does: building coali-
tions, weathering opposition, etc. A competitive election is one 
that gives candidates the ability to show that they have the skills 
necessary to govern effectively. A more wide-open race also in-
creases the chance that a candidate who is cash-poor or lacks name 
recognition, but is the better candidate, may win her party’s prima-
ry. 
Is there, then, an independent value to competition? Yes. Com-
petitive elections form a valuable civic function. They engage more 
voter interest and participation—this increases the likelihood of a 
legitimate election, of course, but it is also an independent good. 
So too is it the case that more informed voters may choose a can-
didate who is better at governing. But it is also good that citizens 
are more aware of who the candidates are. Competitive elections 
increase civic participation because of the interest they generate: 
citizens discuss and debate the merits of the candidates in ways in 
which they might not if one candidate has a “lock” on the nomina-
tion, and the primary is a foregone conclusion. This is obvious 
from the 2008 primary.113 
Competition as an independent good may not have that great of 
a value, however. It may not create an incentive for the state to 
make an election competitive just for the sake of making elections 
more competitive. Moreover, the state also has an interest in hav-
ing a stable election.114 This is closely related to its interest in 
having an election that is legitimate. An election that is too compet-
itive, where there are too many candidates, and where no 
candidate can get the support of a majority of his party’s voters, 
may drag on too long and create uncertainty. The state may then 
have an interest in decreasing the extent to which races are “wide-
open,” because in the end what the state wants is the election of a 
candidate who can govern, not a never-ending civics seminar. 
                                                   
113. See supra note 2 (describing record interest and participation in 2008 primary).  
114. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512, 512 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stressing value of 
democratic stability); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter, 
there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if 
some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.”).  
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Some might conclude that the 2008 Democratic primary was too 
fiercely competitive in precisely this way. The Clinton-Obama race, 
although it excited massive popular interest and participation, 
risked going on too long and becoming too divisive. The worry was 
that the primary would end not just with a battle-tested candidate, 
but also one who was bloodied and poorly prepared for the gen-
eral election. This did not happen, of course. But the specter was 
raised, and may show the limit of the good of competitive elec-
tions. 
3. Governance 
Finally, the state has an important interest in making sure that 
the candidate who is selected by the party can eventually govern 
well.115 That is, the candidate must be able to do the job she might 
be elected to do effectively. This is an interest arguably as great as 
the interest in having a legitimate candidate. If a candidate wins 
the acceptance of the people as legitimate, it may still be a disaster 
for the country if the candidate cannot govern well. 
As already discussed, competitive elections can be one way of 
making sure that a candidate will govern well. A successful candi-
date in an election might be thought to have many of the traits that 
make for a successful office-holder.116 The candidate must be able 
to persuade, to organize, and to rally. A president must also have 
these virtues—indeed; the office of the presidency has frequently 
been called a “permanent campaign.”117  
A candidate for president must also be able to work with and—
hopefully—win the endorsement of the members of the party if he 
is able to win the nomination.118 This may also be seen as an im-
portant test of whether the candidate will govern well. Here the 
interests of the state and the party may converge. One reason for 
instituting superdelegates was the concern of Democrats to make 
                                                   
115. See Howard R. Penniman, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 4 (“The de-
bates in the framing of the Constitution show that every element of the electoral system was 
designed deliberately with an eye toward producing good presidents . . . . A good presiden-
tial selection process required a representative system involving deliberation among people 
who knew the candidates and could make judgments about the candidates’ abilities.”).  
116. But cf. id. at 11 (“[T]he skills required to be successful in the nominating process 
are almost entirely irrelevant to, perhaps even negatively correlated with, the skills required 
to be successful at governing.”).  
117. See generally Sidney Blumenthal, The Permanent Campaign (1982) (detailing 
the many ways the position of president represents a permanent campaign).  
118. See Mann, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 6 (stressing importance of 
“bring[ing] candidates in touch with people who subsequently share in governing” in the 
primaries).  
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sure a Democratic candidate would have to meet and work with the 
higher-ups of the party. They could measure his ability to govern, 
and one aspect of testing that was whether he could negotiate and 
work with them in the context of a competitive election.  
Finally, the act of choosing a vice president is often thought to 
be a measure of the candidate’s ability to govern. It is typically 
thought to be the candidate’s “first” major choice of governance: 
who will he or she select to govern with? What does that decision 
show about the candidate’s ability to make difficult choices? There 
was widespread perception that John McCain’s choice of Sarah Pal-
in as his running mate showed that he just wanted to win, that he 
was not being serious about the office of the presidency.119  
It is unclear what, in general, the state can do to ensure that a 
candidate will be able to govern well. Of course, the state can re-
quire certain things of candidates: that they be of a certain age, or 
be citizens. There are a few things we can say about the type of 
process the state would tend to resist, however, if it were interested 
in governance as a value. It may want to resist a system that gives 
the nomination to a candidate who is relatively untested and who 
wins mainly because of an advantage in fund-raising or celebrity 
status.120 The state may also want to foster strong parties, as entities 
that can hold candidates accountable, and be held accountable 
themselves.121 But regardless of how the state can secure this inter-
est, it seems indisputable that it does indeed have this interest. 
III. Toward Deliberative Primaries 
In the previous Part, I laid out various interests that election law 
scholars have identified as “at play” in their field. I also took pains 
to show how those interests are implicated in current controversies 
                                                   
119. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, The Reason for All of This, The Daily Dish (Nov. 17, 2009, 
2:58 PM), http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/11/the-institute-for-
the-study-of-sarah-palin.html (stating that McCain’s pick of Sarah Palin showed John 
McCain’s “recklessness and cynicism”).  
120. James Ceaser, The Presidential Nomination Mess, 8 Claremont Rev. Books, Fall 
2008, at 21, 25 (“But two nominees now seem to be clear ‘products’ of the new system: Jim-
my Carter and Barack Obama. Neither won on the basis of a substantial record of public 
service or high previous standing in his party. Their victories were due to their performance 
as popular leaders.”).  
121. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 
615 (1996) (“A political party’s independent expression not only reflects its members’ views 
about the philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together, it also seeks to 
convince others to join those members in a practical democratic task, the task of creating a 
government that voters can instruct and hold responsible for subsequent success or fail-
ure.”).  
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about election law. It should be obvious by now that the interests 
are not unique to any one player in the field. Voters will of course 
have an interest in a legitimate election. How could they not? They 
will also want a candidate that will be able to govern once elected. 
Voters who are members of a party may have an interest in keeping 
that party ideologically pure, or at least in giving it the ability to 
regulate its internal affairs as will best suit the party. And candi-
dates—a group I didn’t specifically single out in Part II—certainly 
have an interest in voters being able to vote, an interest in parties 
that can be able to support them, and an interest in a campaign 
process which tests them, yet is fair. So by listing the interests sepa-
rately, I did not mean, by any stretch, to say that the interests are 
exclusive to any one player. Indeed, the interests overlap and,  
because they are interests of many groups, tend to reinforce one 
another.  
But in this Part I want to introduce another constitutional value, 
one that I think in some sense consolidates many of the interests 
and values identified in the previous section. That interest is in de-
liberation. Deliberation is not so much an outcome value as a 
process value: it is less about securing a good result as about mak-
ing sure that result is reached in a certain way, that is, through 
discussion and debate. Then again, many of the values identified in 
the previous Part were process values: the ability to participate and 
have your voice heard, the interest in having a competitive elec-
tion, or a legitimate one—these are all values about ensuring a 
good process, not necessarily a good outcome. But I want to argue 
that by looking at deliberation as a value, and perhaps the chief 
value of the primaries, we can unite many of the various values 
from the previous Part and give them a center.122 
I begin this part by sketching the value of deliberation in elec-
tions, and contrasting it with another view of election law that sees 
elections mostly as devices to aggregate and measure interests. I 
then go on to evaluate two major proposals for reforming the pri-
maries—a series of regional primaries and a national primary—in 
light of both of the various values listed in Part II, and also the val-
ue of deliberation. I contend that a series of regional primaries 
best fulfills both the values of Part II and the meta-value of deliber-
ation. National primaries, though often seen as an improvement 
over the present system and although they seemingly aid some of 
the election law values of Part II, are the inferior option. I close 
                                                   
122. On the rise of deliberation as a value in American campaigns, see generally John 
Gardner, What Are Campaigns For? ch. 1 (2009).  
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this Part by briefly considering the reform proposals made by the 
Democratic Change Commission in its recent Report. 
A. Deliberation vs. Aggregation 
The value of deliberation has often appeared in the Supreme 
Court’s decisions on campaign finance,123 although I think we can 
divorce it from that context here and consider it as an independ-
ent value on its own.124 The rough idea behind it is that in a 
democracy, the goal is not simply a good outcome. That is, the val-
ue of a campaign is not just in electing the best candidate, 
although that is important. There is a value in having a robust de-
bate about the candidates and about the issues, about having 
people think about the candidates and possibly change their 
minds. There is a value, further, in discussion between citizens, be-
tween candidates, and between citizens and candidates. All of these 
process values are goods in themselves, something that campaigns 
and elections can facilitate. 
What are the characteristics of such democratic deliberation, at 
least ideally? For present purposes, we can highlight two. The first 
is that there should be a variety of points of view, so we should try 
to secure as much participation as we can, and hear as many differ-
ent kinds of voices as we can.125 In the campaign finance context, 
this is understandably put in terms of restricting the monopoliza-
tion of debate by the wealthy.126 If the rich are able to give 
                                                   
123. This concern got its classic expression in the now-overruled Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), where Justice Marshall warned of the “corrosive and dis-
torting effects” large contributions from corporations could have on the quality of political 
debate.  
124. Many have found the value of deliberation to be implicit in the First Amendment. 
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty 46 (2005) (understanding the First Amend-
ment’s function “as seeking to facilitate a conversation among ordinary citizens that will 
encourage their informed participation in the electoral process”); see also Owen M. Fiss, 
The Irony of Free Speech 19 (1996); Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of 
Speech and the Many Uses of State Power 67–88 (1996).  
125. See Gardner, supra note 122, at 136 (“In most theories, processes of deliberation 
must be inclusive so that deliberators may consider the greatest variety of viewpoints, a prac-
tice said both to improve the quality of decision making and to ensure that all who will be 
bound by democratic decisions have a voice in making them.” (footnote omitted)). Gard-
ner, I should note, has significant reservations about the value of deliberation in electoral 
politics.  
126. See, e.g., Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (denouncing “the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form 
and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
ideas”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (“According to  
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unlimited sums to candidates, the reasoning goes, only the candi-
dates they favor will be heard. Those who are able only to give 
modest sums or no money at all, will not be able to have their can-
didates heard. In the familiar metaphor, the megaphone of the 
rich will drown out the voices of the poor.127 And the more people 
who can be heard, the argument continues, the better the debate 
will be. Not only will it be more representative, the conclusions 
reached will likely be better for having considered a wide range of 
viewpoints.128 
Second, deliberation holds out the promise that debate will not 
merely reinforce people’s views on a particular position—that they 
will leave the process with the same views that they entered in 
with—but that it might transform them.129 By hearing all sides of 
the debate and by engaging with them, one might leave a discus-
sion with one’s position changed. Perhaps this means that you hold 
your initial position with much less certainty, you modify it slightly, 
or you repudiate it all together. None of these options are required 
by deliberation, but deliberation holds open the possibility that one or 
all of these things could happen, and this is seen as a good thing in 
itself.  
Deliberation as a value is usefully contrasted with a view of elec-
tions that sees them merely as aggregating pre-existing 
preferences.130 If elections merely exist to tabulate and tally what 
                                                   
appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out other points 
of view.”).  
127. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 
(2000) (No. 98-963), 1999 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 76 (“A big megaphone can drown out the 
smaller ones, and if Missouri wants the smaller ones also to have a voice, maybe it has to 
limit the size of the larger one, and if that’s so, isn’t that just as important a constitutional 
interest as the First Amendment interest of Ebenezer Scrooge?”).  
128. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 200 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (“The minor party’s often unconventional positions broaden political debate, expand 
the range of issues with which the electorate is concerned, and influence the positions of the 
majority, in some instances ultimately becoming majority positions.”). See generally Gardner, 
supra note 122, at 48–49. The locus classicus for this point is J.S. Mill’s On Liberty. John Stu-
art Mill, On Liberty 42–43 (Ticknor & Fields 1863) (1859) (comparing a position with 
those of others is the best way of testing it).  
129. Dennis F. Thompson, Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in 
the United States 195 (2002) (“As deliberators, citizens modify their views in response to 
the views voiced by others. When citizens vote, they simply record their own conclusions. 
They do not change them in response to anyone.”).  
130. Id. at 202 n.20 (noting that deliberative theory “is often contrasted with aggrega-
tive theory, which requires only that citizens or their representatives express individual 
preferences. Aggregative theory typically relies on voting to turn theses individual prefer-
ences into collective outcomes . . . .”); see also Gardner, supra note 122, at 136 
(“[D]eliberative theories understand preferences to be formed endogenously, in the cruici-
ble of politics itself, through the give and take of discussion with other citizens of different 
views.”). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution ch. 6 (1993).  
Flanders FTP B.doc  7/11/2011 10:57 AM 
Summer 2011] What Do We Want in a Presidential Primary? 35 
people think already, deliberation is at best useless and at worst a 
distraction. Why have many points of view if the goal is just to add 
up preferences? Why have a process that might encourage people 
to change their preferences? Such a process could be profoundly 
destabilizing and disorienting. It would make it harder for elec-
tions to unambiguously register the opinions and the preferences 
of the voters. On the aggregation picture there is no independent 
value to having people deliberate at length, or even at all. It may at 
best serve the secondary function of making sure that the prefer-
ences people vote are their “true” preferences, ones that are not 
likely to change. 
Deliberation as a value captures many of the values that were ar-
ticulated and laid out in Part II of this Article. It also transforms 
and unifies them, and helps us see how they contribute to an un-
derlying vision of deliberative primaries. The right to vote, on the 
deliberative picture, is no longer a merely formal value. That is, it is 
not merely about the right to be heard, although this is important. 
It is the right, more fundamentally, to participate in the process 
along with others. It now can be seen as having a positive value, 
and not merely a negative one (to be free from obstacles to vot-
ing). Your formal right to vote also indicates your right to engage 
in the ongoing debate that is the primary election season, and to 
have your voice counted in the end. It is your ticket to the delibera-
tive process.131 
So too might we see the idea of having a meaningful and effec-
tive vote as necessary to ensure that diverse voices are represented 
in the debate. The process should not be confined just to one 
segment of the population, but should give all types of people the 
opportunity to influence and contribute to the debate. Iowa and 
New Hampshire should not be allowed to drown out the voices of 
the other states. Nor should the primary process unfairly burden 
or exclude the voices of those not from the two major parties.  
The value of party autonomy and independence can also be 
viewed through this lens. Having parties that represent distinct 
viewpoints can add to deliberation by clarifying the options voters 
have, and by presenting a consistent and coherent governing phi-
losophy. They can be the starting points for voters to think about 
the merits of the candidates who seek to be the party’s representa-
tive. Even party autonomy might aid deliberation—if parties feel 
that the party is getting too isolated or out of touch, they may seek 
the input of those from outside the parties. Either way, parties can 
                                                   
131. At the same time, as I emphasize in the conclusion, there are many ways that one 
can engage in the deliberative process that do not end with casting a ballot.  
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be seen as vital to deliberation, and so deserving of extra protec-
tion. 
Finally, deliberation enhances and preserves the state’s interests 
as well. It seems plausible that a candidate who has been selected 
after deliberation is a more “legitimate” candidate than one who 
has just been selected by a popular vote with no deliberation. De-
liberation implies that we not only know the candidate’s views, but 
have also thought about them, and found them to be persuasive—
or at least better than the alternative. We are not just registering 
our gut feelings, which we may later come to regret. 
Deliberation also reveals the state’s interest in competition and 
puts it in a clearer light. Competitive elections are more likely to 
involve considering and debating the differences between candi-
dates. If one candidate has a lock on the primary, there is little 
incentive to do so: why bother deliberating, if such deliberation 
will be useless? And a candidate who has to engage with many 
points of view may be thought to be better at governing. 
So I conclude that at as a value, deliberation has much in favor 
of it. It is an important value in its own right, and it also helps us to 
understand how the values of individual voters, parties, and the 
state may be unified. Deliberation works, when it works, to the ad-
vantage of all concerned. But how can we get deliberation to work?  
B. A National Primary 
For decades, a favorite proposal of reformers has been a nation-
al primary system: have all of the states hold their primaries on the 
same day.132 This proposal has several advantages, which we can see 
by referring to the constitutional values of Part II. Perhaps its 
greatest virtue comes with the right to vote, considered in its many 
guises. A national primary, presumably, would eliminate the caucus 
system, and allow each registered voter to cast a vote on National 
Primary day. So too would it, presumably, eliminate the advantage 
that Iowa and New Hampshire currently have (although one could 
imagine a modified national primary that would retain the tradi-
tional early status of those two states). If all states had their 
primaries on the same day, every state, and every voter could in 
principle be the “deciding” vote of the primary election. There 
                                                   
132. See, e.g., Thomas Gangale, From the Primaries to the Polls: How to Repair 
America’s Broken Presidential Nomination Process 95–97 (2008) (comparing the 
author’s favored “American Plan” with a national primary); Ranney, supra note 30, at 7–8 
(discussion and analysis of various proposals for a national primary day, “not only the oldest 
reform proposal . . . but also the most frequent”).  
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would no longer be an advantage to states that held their primaries 
earlier and got to play a potentially pivotal role in selecting the 
nominee. Every vote, it seems, would have an equal chance of be-
ing effective. This is not something to take lightly, and indeed is 
the principal advantage of a national primary. Moreover, it is intui-
tively plausible that a national primary would increase interest and 
increase turnout. It terms of getting the most participation from 
ordinary people, the national primary scores high.133 
There are other advantages. From the perspective of the politi-
cal parties, they may see it as in their interest to have a candidate 
who—even at the primary stage—has shown definite and genuine 
“national” appeal and who could therefore make a strong showing 
in the general election. And presumably a candidate who was able 
to win a majority of the votes on national primary day may seen by 
the voters to be more legitimate. He or she would not merely be a 
“favorite son” or “favorite daughter” of a particular state or a par-
ticular region, but someone whom the nation saw as real 
presidential material.  
But there are some obvious drawbacks to the proposal as well. 
Let me first view them through some of the values in Part II, and 
then consider the national primary in light of the value of deliber-
ation.  
For starters, the national primary might be thought to make it 
difficult for less well-known candidates to win.134 They will not have 
the name recognition to capture many votes nationally, and they 
will not have the money to run a national campaign. This is bad for 
the value of a meaningful vote. The fewer “smaller” candidates who 
are able to run an effective campaign, the less choice voters will 
have come primary time. Moreover, a national primary may not be 
a very competitive race, if a well-funded and well-known candidate 
is able to take an early lead and sprint ahead of the field. He or she 
will able to sew up the nomination rather quickly—indeed, after 
the national primary is held, the race will be over. 
If we restricted ourselves to only these values—the values in Part 
II—we might think that the balance tips in favor of a national pri-
mary. After all, it does a better job at securing an equal right to 
vote, and ensures a “national” candidate, and participation would 
doubtless increase. But things look different after we consider the 
value of deliberation. The national primary is a perfect example of 
                                                   
133. It is also popular. See Springer & Gibson, supra note 109, at 109, 123; Ritchie & Fi-
dalgo, supra note 76 (reporting that 72% of Americans favor a single national primary).  
134. Ranney, supra note 30, at 19 (“[A] one-day national direct primary probably could 
be won only by a contender already well known and well financed.”).  
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a system tailored toward an aggregative model of politics: we have 
our fixed preferences, and we vote, and then the candidate with 
the most votes wins. There is no need to drag out the process.  
However, if we look at things in terms of deliberation, the na-
tional primary appears as something close to a disaster. It favors 
mainstream candidates who already have wide appeal and name 
recognition. Crowding out third party candidates may hinder the 
right to a meaningful vote; but that crowding out is also salient be-
cause it means that there are fewer voices in the conversation. 
These voices matter, not only because someone may want to vote 
for the “marginal candidate,” but also because the “marginal can-
didate” can bring new perspectives to the table, and force the 
mainstream candidate to consider that perspective—and perhaps 
alter his or her own position in light of it. 
The variety of perspectives is also relevant if we consider the 
states as having primaries at different times as opposed to having 
one day when the primary takes place. A one-day primary in all fifty 
states is a national primary. It is not fifty separate primaries. But 
when you spread out the primaries and across different states and 
different regions at different times, more issues become salient. In 
particular, regional issues become salient. A national primary would 
have to be about major national issues. Regional and state prima-
ries, however, would be more about local issues; candidates who 
hope to win in a state or regional primary would have to pay atten-
tion to those issues.  
Moreover, deliberation—unlike aggregation—takes time. It is a 
process that cannot be done in a day (even a day of delibera-
tion135). That is why if we had only one day to vote and to decide 
the nominee, this would be a disaster for deliberation. Delibera-
tion presupposes the possibility and the actuality that people will 
change their preferences or at least better inform their prefer-
ences if they are given information and time to think about that 
information.136 If the primary is just a one shot affair, then the 
possibility of meaningful deliberation is foreclosed, or at least 
strongly curtailed, from the start. 
This is why the 2008 primaries were not a good test of the idea 
of a national primary. Many pundits talked about (and feared) a 
                                                   
135. See Flanders, Deliberative Dilemmas, supra note 16, at 164 (discussing the proposal by 
Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin for a national “deliberation day”). Moreover, longer 
primaries mean different candidates will fare better at different times; the race will not 
quickly be between the Democratic and the Republican nominees, but between many Dem-
ocratic and many Republican nominees. This can only be a boon to deliberation.  
136. Cf. Kirkpatrick, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 24 (emphasizing the 
value of “prolonging the decision process”).  
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“de facto” national primary, when over half of the states held their 
primary on the same day. But it was not a true national primary. 
The presidential candidate for the Democratic Party was not cho-
sen on that day, and indeed the race dragged on for several more 
months. It was precisely because we did not have a true national 
primary that the race was as successful as it was. There was compe-
tition between two high profile and extremely able candidates. 
There was deliberation, because there was time for people to re-
flect and consider the differences between the two candidates.137 
C. Regional Primaries 
The other major reform proposal is a system of regional prima-
ries.138 The details between competing plans will differ, but the 
basic idea is as follows. States will be grouped along regional lines, 
reflecting both geography and interests. The regional primaries 
would then be spread apart by a couple of weeks, and held 
throughout the primary season. Some plans have the smaller states 
going first. Some would have the first region to hold a contest be 
chosen randomly. Still other plans favor having regions each go 
first on a rotating basis. And once more, as with a national primary, 
we can imagine a system that would leave the traditional “first 
state” status with Iowa and New Hampshire and then have a re-
gional primary with the remaining states. 
As opposed to the national primary, the disadvantages of the re-
gional primary with regard to having an effective vote seem to 
stand out. Those states in the region that goes first will still have an 
advantage in choosing the nominee. Invariably, the candidate who 
picks up the first region will have momentum going into the next 
                                                   
137. But is the problem merely with a national primary, or with having a national pri-
mary very early in the primary season? Both. An early national primary cuts shorts debate 
before most people are paying attention. But even a later national primary would not be 
ideal. By spreading the contests out, there is a greater chance to sustain voter interest and 
participation for several months. Having one national primary late in the primary season 
might make for intense debate for a few weeks before the national primary, but not much 
more.  
138. See Martinson, supra note 22, at 200 (explaining how “the [‘California Plan’] ran-
domly generates a primary calendar, while ensuring that the schedule is spread out over ten, 
two-week intervals, and allowing for fewer delegates to be selected in the first few weeks so as 
to guarantee retail politicking”); Nichols, supra note 4, at 14 (describing the “Delaware Plan” 
where “the smallest twelve states would have chosen delegates in March, the next smallest 
fourteen in April, the next thirteen in May and the remainder in June”); The American Plan, 
Fix the Primaries, http://www.fixtheprimaries.com/solutions/americanplan/ (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2011) (describing a system which “features a schedule consisting of ten intervals, 
generally of two weeks, during which randomly selected states may hold their primaries”).  
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set of contests. Those who are in the later regions, and especially 
those in the last region to have its primaries, may feel that their 
voice is not being heard. 
This is a serious worry. At the same time, it can be overstated. 
Some candidates will have regional advantages—they may be Sena-
tors or Governors in state with later primaries—and may be able to 
make a strong showing late in the primary season, even after get-
ting off to a poor or rocky start. Moreover, there is a chance that 
the campaign will start in a region in which no candidate has a de-
cisive advantage, so that even after the first primary day, there is 
still a relatively open contest. Finally, if the regions take turns going 
first, the unfairness of one primary season could be mitigated in 
the next.  
But whatever unfairness lingers seems to be made up by the ad-
vantages of the regional primary system in terms of the goal of 
deliberation. By breaking up the contest and spreading it out over 
time, one reduces the risk that a celebrity candidate can simply 
dominate the first set of primaries and make the remaining prima-
ries irrelevant. It also gives various regional stars a chance to shine 
later in the primary season, when their state or region comes to 
vote. They may at least have a chance to shine, even if they cannot 
translate their regional celebrity into a national candidacy. Or a 
lesser-known candidate can slowly build support by making a good 
showing in the early primaries. The fact that the primaries will be 
spread out over time will give voters a chance to think and assess 
the various candidates. The primary season will not be over in a 
day, at least if things go according to plan. 
D. The Democratic “Change Commission” Proposal 
The Democratic National Primary “Change Commission” (the 
“Commission”) made three major recommendations for changing 
the primary process.139 The first involved the timing of the prima-
ries.140 The Commission proposed moving the start date of the 
primaries back to February (the earliest primaries would be held 
no sooner than February 1) and to encourage states to cluster their 
primaries in regions. They would do this, not by sanctioning those 
states that cut ahead in line (as they tried, unsuccessfully, to do in 
2008), but by offering “bonus” delegates and other inducements to 
                                                   
139. Report, supra note 5, at 17–21.  
140. Id. at 17–18.  
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states which opt to participate in a regional cluster.141 In other 
words, the DNC has firmly sided with the idea of a regional prima-
ry, against the related trends of frontloading and a national 
primary. However, the Commission did not recommend removing 
the priority given to New Hampshire, Iowa, Nevada, and South 
Carolina. They can have their primaries or caucuses in February.142 
All other states must wait until the first Tuesday in March. 
The second reform recommended by the Commission was to 
remove the influence of unpledged delegates, or superdelegates.143 
Concerned that superdelegates nearly had a decisive role in choos-
ing the nominee in 2008, the Commission wanted the nominee to 
reflect entirely the wishes of the voters in the states.144 All delegates, 
the Commission said, should be assigned based on the result of 
state primaries and caucuses: the party leaders would now be able 
to attend the party either as “assigned delegates” or as non-voting 
delegates.145 The effect of this reform would be to eliminate the 
possibility that superdelegates could act as a meaningful counter-
weight on the nominee as determined by the popular vote.  
The Commission’s final set of recommendations, regarding the 
caucuses, were more tentative.146 The Commission expressed a con-
cern about people being able to attend the caucuses, and about 
haphazard organization on the part of many states. They did not 
propose abolishing the caucus system, nor did they formally rec-
ommend against it. Rather, they counseled the adopting of a set of 
“Best Practices” in order to guide states that use the caucus sys-
tem.147  
How do these reforms fare in light of the values articulated in 
this paper? The move towards regional primaries, which the Com-
mission recommends (and suggests a mechanism for 
encouraging), gets high marks for promoting deliberation. The 
idea of spreading out the primaries gives more time to consider 
the candidates, and the regional emphasis may give the edge to less 
                                                   
141. Id. at 18.  
142. These primaries and caucuses are referred to as “pre-window” events. Id.  
143. Report, supra note 5, at 18–19.  
144. See Michael O’Brien, DNC to Reform Primary System, Cutting Many ‘Superdelegates’, The 
Hill’s Blog Briefing Room, (Mar. 23, 2009, 3:12 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-
briefing-room/news/campaigns/37604-dnc-to-reform-primary-system-cutting-many-
superdelegates (noting desire of the Democratic National Committee to “put voters first”); 
Tom Schaller, DCC Trying to Encourage Regional Primaries, FiveThirtyEight (Jan. 13, 2010, 
3:42 PM), http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/01/dcc-trying-to-encourage-regional.html 
(“The overwhelming view was that reforms needed to be made to ensure that the prefer-
ences of the voters was not overridden by unelected delegates . . . .”)  
145. Report, supra note 5, at 19.  
146. Cf. id. at 20–21.  
147. Id. at 21.  
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well-known candidates. So this should be considered to be on the 
right track. 
What of the other reforms? The demise of superdelegates—
something which now seems inevitable—should be looked at as a 
mixed blessing. To be sure, the Commission is right that giving  
superdelegates a vote risks not having the nominee be entirely a 
matter of the popular vote. In a superdelegate system, candidates 
will have to persuade both the people and the party regulars if they 
want to be assured of the nomination. But was this entirely a bad 
thing? The whole idea of superdelegates was to have them act as a 
check on the popular favorite—to avoid a candidate who could 
win, but who might not be successful at governing or in advancing 
the party’s interests.148 Moreover, we might even think of the super-
delegates as adding an additional voice to the deliberative process. 
Candidates will have to engage not only the interests of the voters-
at-large, which might be focused on the short term, but also to the 
party hierarchy, which has the party’s long term interests at heart. 
The loss of superdelegates is not an unmitigated good. It is part of 
a trend, which now seems inevitable, towards complete popular 
control of the primaries.149 We might have reasons to lament that 
trend.150  
The Commission’s recommendation on caucuses reflected a de-
cided ambivalence about their existence. Caucuses present 
logistical problems that are absent from regular primaries.151 But 
they nonetheless have an advantage on the deliberative front. Cau-
cuses, at least in principle, require discussion and persuasion. 
Minds can be changed during the caucus—a far cry from the pri-
vate voting booth, where a simple preference is recorded. So the 
logistical challenges may be worth it. But the battle to defend cau-
                                                   
148. As Nelson Polsby famously said, “[p]eer review is a criterion which entails the mo-
bilization within the party of a capacity to assess the qualities of candidates for public office 
according to such dimensions as intelligence, sobriety of judgment, intellectual flexibility, 
ability to work well with others, willingness to learn from experience, detailed personal 
knowledge of government, and other personal characteristics which can best be revealed 
through personal acquaintance.” Nelson W. Polsby, Consequences of Party Re-
form 169–70 (1983).  
149. See Mann, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 25–26 (stating that “the ten-
dency toward direct democracy is a substantial theme in our politics, in our culture”); 
Ranney, supra note 30, at 13 (“Ever since the triumph of the Progressive movement . . . one 
of the criteria by which Americans have most often judged their political institutions is that 
of participation . . . .”); Wang, supra note 69, at 4 (“We now are in an era in which the con-
sensus is that nominating contests should be broadly participatory, not exclusionary, and 
reflective of the will of the rank and file.”).  
150. I discuss this point more in the conclusion.  
151. See supra Part II.A.1 (indicating difficulties with certain groups being able to partic-
ipate in caucuses).  
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cuses may ultimately be a losing one: in the face of the increasing 
pressure for more direct democracy as well as the logistical prob-
lems that beset caucuses, the day of the caucus may soon be 
coming to an end. 
Conclusion 
What do we want in a presidential primary? What should we 
want? I have not tried to give a definitive answer to these questions, 
although I have indicated my sympathy for certain reforms of the 
process in light of the meta-value of deliberation. Rather, my main 
aim has been to give us a framework, or more precisely a set of val-
ues, that we can use in analyzing our current primary process as 
well as proposals for reforming that process. These values are taken 
from the field of election law, which has, over the past two decades, 
emerged as a vital and dynamic area of legal scholarship. Election 
law’s contribution to the debate over primaries, I have argued, is to 
isolate certain entities and certain values as having a constitutional 
significance. Individual voters have the right to vote considered 
along many dimensions: they have the right to participate, the 
right to an effective vote, and the right to a meaningful vote. Politi-
cal parties have interests in maintaining both their autonomy and 
their ideological purity: two values which are sometimes at odds 
with one another. State and federal governments have interests in 
ensuring that elections are legitimate and corruption free, that 
they are competitive, and that they result in electing someone who 
can actually govern. If we examine these values, we can find them 
all in play—to greater and lesser degrees—in the presidential pri-
maries. This is what I hope to have shown in Part II.  
Election law also suggests a deeper value which might unite the 
various interests and players in the process. That value is delibera-
tion. I highlighted the significance of that value in evaluating 
proposals for reforming the primary process in Part III. 
But in addition to providing an analytical framework to use in 
understanding and evaluating the presidential primary system, I 
hope to have set the stage for a deeper questioning of what presi-
dential primaries are for, especially as compared to the general 
presidential election contest. Are the same values as relevant in the 
presidential primary as they are in the general election for presi-
dent?152 I have suggested that deliberation should be given a 
                                                   
152. See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 36 (stating that parties are not obliged to “hew to 
an ideal of more direct democracy that we aspire to follow in electing public officials”); 
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greater and more important role in the primaries than in the gen-
eral election. To use the language of Part III, it may be more 
important to aggregate votes—to make sure everyone can have 
their preference recorded—in the general election. But this may 
leave it open for the presidential primaries to be less concerned 
about recording preferences than in encouraging deliberation 
among citizens. Perhaps we should be less worried about giving 
everyone an equally effective vote in the primaries (something a 
national primary would ensure) and more about making sure that 
the process does a good job of testing candidates and sparking a 
national conversation about their merits. From this angle, it may 
be less important that one’s state or region be decisive in picking a 
candidate (i.e., that one has an “effective vote”) and more im-
portant that there is a competitive campaign and a diverse group 
of candidates. There are many ways to participate in the political 
process other than simply casting a ballot. Ironically, those ele-
ments of the primary system that are most disdained—the 
preference to Iowa and New Hampshire, caucuses, superdelegates, 
and conventions—may have the greatest potential to enhance de-
liberation. In thinking about how to reform the primaries, we 
should not be so quick to overlook those things that actually pre-
serve deliberation in the status quo and which we might want to 
keep. Thus, we might want to resist the trend of more states having 
their primaries on the same day, as well as the move to eliminate or 
reduce the power of superdelegates.  
If we look at deliberation as the “master value” we should seek to 
promote in the primaries, then the answer we give to my title ques-
tion—what do we want in a presidential primary?—may be very 
different than the answer to the question, what do we want in a 
general election? The tendency in both the law and in the study of 
it has been to assimilate the primary process to the general elec-
tion process. Both involve the same players and the same interests, 
so it is only natural to assume that they should emphasize the same 
values. And indeed, when it comes to fundamental rights, such as 
the right to cast a ballot, it is unquestionable that they should share 
the same values. But beyond this, perhaps we should question 
whether all values should be considered the same in the primaries 
and in the general elections. In particular, we should be open to 
ways in which the primaries might become more deliberative, even 
                                                   
Hasen, supra note 69 (noting different Constitutional standards for primary and general 
elections).  
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if they are not directly “democratic.”153 The trend now, at least in 
fact if not in law, is for the primaries to resemble the general elec-
tion: to make securing the nomination a single-shot, national, and 
popular affair. If we care about deliberation, we should resist this 
trend.  
                                                   
153. Cf. Ceaser et al., supra note 5, at 121–22 (calling superdelegates and caucuses the 
“least democratic” aspects of the primary campaign).  
